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BAD ROLE MODELS?
AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON ISRAELI CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY
By Hadar Aviram *
ABSTRACT
In this Article I rely on the public policy concept of "policy transfer" to
examine the impact of U.S. legislation, litigation, and politics on the Israeli
criminal justice landscape. The Article identifies four eras: 1. The Great Light
from the West - the ascent of U.S. criminal justice as British influence fades;
2. The Decade of Rights - a misperception of America as a paragon of criminal
justice rights and protections that results in influences on Israeli
jurisprudence; 3. The Law-and-Order Enchantment Period - a time at which
Israeli scholars and policymakers import punitive trends from the U.S.,
particularly in the area of innovation in policing and victims’ rights; and 4.
The Era of Contention - a time at which Israeli scholars and policymakers
bring with them critical perspectives on the U.S. and Israeli policy begins to
question, and deviate from, its American counterpart. I conclude that
changing patterns of elite networking can explain why Israel, initially in
thrall to what it perceived as a paragon of civil rights, eventually parted ways
with the U.S. as a source of influence: the emergence of a class of academics,
public defenders, and policymakers educated in the U.S. and conversant in
American criminological literature critical of the punitive turn and mass
incarceration brought about informed critiques of the American model and led
to a "sobering up" of the Israeli policymaking world. The Article proceeds to
explain the relationship between the two countries through the framework of
American Political Development. Following Malcolm Feeley's analysis, the
Article finds that both countries – self-defining as "developed" – actually
*
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Past President, Western Society of Criminology. Formerly taught at Tel Aviv
University, Haifa University, and the College of Management. I would like to thank
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of this piece. Special thanks go to Dana Pugach and Guy Rubinstein, whose comments
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exhibit features of developing countries in the context of criminal justice: high
levels of interpersonal violence and intolerance, a constant problem of police
overreach, a legacy of racism and exclusion, high availability of weapons, and
political corruption. This might explain Israel's fascination with American
criminal justice not as an inspiration, but as cultural recognition of the
similarities between the countries.
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Gangs of savages in the streets,
their eyes gazing and stupid.
Their father watches TV and screams,
“Kill everyone!”
America is near.
Our eyes are glued to the sun
Because that is where our great hope comes from
After the next war,
The next war. 1
The issue is not whether we draw lessons from
experience, but whether we do so well or badly. 2
INTRODUCTION
After almost five decades of soaring incarceration rates, in
2014, the National Research Council’s Committee on Causes and
Consequences of High Rates of Incarceration issued a comprehensive
report on mass incarceration in the United States. 3 The report identifies
the usual culprits: aggressive law enforcement and prosecution
policies, private interests and investments in the criminal justice
system, the escalation of the war on drugs and its racial undertones,
and urban economic distress. The report also stresses the traumatic
physical, economic, and psychological consequences of mass
incarceration, for inmates and for their families.
A year later, in August 2015, the Committee’s Israeli
counterpart--the Public Committee for Examining Sentencing Policy
and the Treatment of Offenders, chaired by retired Israel Supreme
Court Judge Dalia Dorner published its own report. 4 The report
stressed the harms of incarceration and the need to find non-custodial
Eifo HaYeled, “America Krovah” (America Is Near) (1993).
Richard Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time
and Place (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers 1993).
3
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON LAW AND JUSTICE, Division of
Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, The Growth of Incarceration in the
United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences, available at https://www.nap.
edu/read/18613/chapter/1.
4
The Public Committee Examining the Punishment and Treatment of Offenders,
Report to the Minister of Justice, available at http://www.justice.gov.il/Units/
SanegoriaZiborit/News/Documents/dorner%20report.pdf.
1
2
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alternatives. Surprisingly, the Dorner Committee’s report decries
problems in Israel which closely echo the causes of incarceration
identified by the American committee: an increased reliance on law
enforcement, disproportionate policing and prosecution of people
from disadvantaged backgrounds and communities, a growth in fear
of crime, difficult dilemmas involving the victim’s role in the criminal
process, and the creep of the market into the punishment field.
How, and why, had Israel come to walk in the United States’
criminal justice footsteps, and how did it come to recant that at an era
many American scholars characterize as “late mass incarceration”? 5 To
what extent are these similar conclusions about the perverseness of
mass incarceration the consequence of similar criminal justice policies?
And if they are, how did Israel, a state whose independence from the
British Mandate was characterized by a strong dominance of
European-inspired welfare socialism, 6 come to look to the United
States, a larger, more fragmented, and much more market-based state,
for criminal justice inspiration?
This article examines a number of crucial actions affecting
criminal justice law and policies in Israel from the early 1980s to the
late 2010s, tracing the ebb and flow of American (and other) influences.
My point of departure is the robust body of public policy literature on
the concept of transnational “policy transfer.” Colin Bennett identifies
four modes of policy transfer, 7 ranging from the least to the most
coercive. Emulation, or as Richard Rose refers to it, “lesson drawing,” 8
involves the voluntary and deliberate reliance on another country’s
policy experience to create a domestic version of it. Elite-networking
involves policy transfers through transnational groups of actors
sharing expertise and information about a common problem, often
outside the realm of formal domestic politics, and in the context of an
evolving international policy culture. Harmonization refers to
For one representative example, see Christopher Seeds, Bifurcation Nation:
American Penal Policy in Late Mass Incarceration, 19 SOCIAL JUSTICE 590 (2016).
6
Ben-Zion Zilberfarb, From Socialism to Free Market – The Israeli Economy, 1948–
2003, 11 ISRAEL AFFAIRS 12 (2006).
7
Colin J. Bennett, What is policy convergence and what causes it, 21 BRITISH J. OF
POL. SCI. 215 (1991).
8
Richard Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time
and Place (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers 1993).
5
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formally adopted policy changes deliberately structured to globalize
approaches for common problems through the work of
intergovernmental organizations and structures. Finally, penetration
is a coercive form of policy transfer, in which nation states have to
comply with policy directives from other nations or from transnational
organizations.
Relying on Bennett’s framework, Trevor Jones and Tim
Newburn 9 find that some criminal justice trends in the United
Kingdom, such as privatized corrections, zero tolerance policing, and
‘two’ and ‘three strikes sentencing’, evince considerable U.S. influence,
and are the consequence of emulation and, to some extent, elite
networking. Jones and Newburn remind us that policy transfer can
involve various aspects of policy, including goals, structure and
content; policy instruments and administrative techniques;
institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts; and negative as
well as positive lessons. 10 They also find that transnational influence
can have deep and lasting impact even if it occurs through voluntary
adoption rather than coercive means. 11
Jones and Newburn’s observations can be easily applied to
Israel, which is particularly amenable to relying on U.S. law. In his
analysis of foreign law usage among domestic courts, Andrea Lollini
identifies Israel as one of the countries that explicitly mentions
comparative law as an authorized source for judicial decisions. 12 One
of Israel’s Supreme Court Justices has even written academically about
the importance of foreign law, highlighting the role of U.S. Law. 13
9
Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, Learning from Uncle Sam? Exploring U.S.
Influences on British Crime Control Policy, 15 GOVERNANCE 99 (2002).
10
David Dolowitz & David Marsh, Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the
Policy Transfer Literature, 44 POL. STUD. 343, 349-50 (1996).
11
See Laura Nader, Human Rights and Moral Imperialism, Anthropology News,
September 2006, at 6 (Indeed, some methods of coercion, such as imposing the
constitution on Iraq, were not found to be effective); See generally Ugo Mattei &
Laura Nader, Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal (2008).
12 Andrea Lollini, The South African Constitutional Court Experience: Reasoning
Patterns Based on Foreign Law, 8 Utrecht Law Review 55 (2012); see generally
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
International Impact of Rehnquist Court, 34 Tulsa L.J. 15 (1998).
13
Eliezer Rivlin, Thoughts on Referral to Foreign Law, Global Chain-Novel, and
Novelty, 21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009).
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Much of the writing on global influences has focused on the
constitutional arena, which sometimes dovetails with criminal justice
policy.
As I argue in this article, Israeli criminal justice policy has been
influenced by its American counterpart in various ways, mostly
through emulation and unique forms of elite networking. I identify
four schemas through which Israeli criminal justice policy relates to its
American counterpart. While there is a rough chronological logic to
the presentation of the schemas, there are big overlaps in time, and it
makes more sense to relate to the schemas as different strands in the
Israeli policymaking community than as easily distinguishable
periods. Within these schemas, it is also important to keep in mind that
criminal justice policies and practices in Israel, as in every other
country, are made by a variety of players in the legal field—politicians,
government lawyers, public interest and nonprofit lawyers, prominent
academics—and those have different ways of relating to the U.S.
experience, which manifest in policies that latch onto different
schemas.
The first schema, which I refer to in Part I as The Great New
Light from the West, identifies the early days of U.S. influence as a
direct continuation of Israeli use of British common law. In the early
1980s, as Israel officially severed its legal ties with its former British
rulers, U.S. law was poised to take the place of British precedent as a
main form of influence on Israeli law. I explain why, before the largescale reform of Israeli substantive criminal law, the U.S. was a natural
source of inspiration for Israeli jurists; I then juxtapose the rise in
prominence of U.S. law in the Israeli legal psyche with American
isolationism and exceptionalism, establishing an obvious one-way
path for policy transfer.
The second schema, which I examine in Part II, is the Decade
of Rights. The 1990s were characterized by an intriguing dichotomy
between substantive criminal law, whose massive overhaul 1994
evinces distinct German impression, and criminal procedure, which
shows a clear imprint of how Israeli scholars at the time perceived U.S.
criminal procedure. The latter changes are reflected in three important
developments in Israel: The enactment of the Basic Law of Human
Dignity and Freedom in 1992, the enactment of the new arrest law in
1996, and the emergence of Israel’s Public Defender’s Office. As a
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consequence of these moves, Israeli enthusiasm about U.S. law was
mostly in the areas of formal due process and displays particular
fascination with the exclusionary rule.
The third schema, which I examine in Part III, is the Heyday of
Law and Order. During this era, between the late 1990s and the mid2000s, Israeli legislators, policymakers, and academics seem to
perceive U.S. criminal justice as it is: a punitive law and order system
emphasizing aggressive law enforcement against street crime and a
clear effort to prioritize victim rights and advocacy. Israeli
developments along these lines are decidedly American, though they
stop shy of some of the worst developments in the United States (such
as opening sex offender registration to public viewing).
Finally, the fourth schema, portrayed in Part IV, is the Era of
Contention. From the mid-2000s onward, Israeli policymaking in
criminal justice reflects a sophisticated conversation about the
appropriateness of using the United States as a source of inspiration.
The growing awareness of mass incarceration and its discontents, the
impact of the financial crisis, the Obama era of reform, and the
increasing dominance of U.S.-educated criminal justice scholars in the
policy arena led to disillusionment with the U.S. among many
influential players in the Israeli policymaking field. This period is
characterized by a rejection of prison privatization, successful
litigation against prison overcrowding, and the search for new
inspiration in other countries, such as the Swedish model of
addressing sex work.
Part V discusses these developments in light of the policy
literature. First, I observe that, in the first and second schemas, the
emulation was limited for the most part to “law in the books,”
reflecting unexamined assumptions about how the United States’
Warren Court’s constitutional framework played out in the legal field.
In the third and fourth schemas, two modes of policy transfer are
evident: policy emulation through lesson drawing—both positive and
negative—and elite networking through the participation of Israeli
academics and policymakers in the academic conversation about
American criminal justice. These different currents reflect multiple
voices within both countries whose opinions about criminal justice
reform run the political gamut. I then attempt to make sense of the
particular relationship between Israel and the United States by relying
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on Malcolm Feeley’s recent application of a political science
framework, American Political Development (APD), to the criminal
justice field. 14 As I argue here, the United States and Israel share
numerous characteristics of developing countries, by contrast to their
usual perception as highly developed nations. These characteristics,
despite the different context and difference in size, imply that the two
nations face similar challenges in criminal justice: deep-seated
institutional and cultural racism and nationalism, a culture of violence,
and high levels of political corruption. These challenges mean that, just
as the United States would be better advised to abandon its isolationist
policies and look comparatively at criminal justice, Israel would be
better advised to deepen the nuance of its relationship with the United
States and look for inspiration elsewhere.
I. THE GREAT NEW LIGHT FROM THE WEST
A. Israel as a British Colony
Israeli law students reading old criminal law cases are often
struck by how foreign their reasoning and references feel. Cases from
the 1950s in particular retain a foreign flavor, part of which can be
attributed to the foreign legal education of the first Supreme Court
Justices. 15 However, much of the “foreignness” of these cases comes
from the multiple and dense references to British caselaw to illuminate
the Criminal Law Ordinance of 1936, 16 a relic of Mandatory Britain that
remained in effect well into the late 1970s.
The Ordinance was not a carbon copy of British criminal law.
Rather, it was a version of it, adapting British principles, to be used in
British colonies, which were deemed to be unsuitable for some or all
of British Law. 17 Indeed, the practice of criminal justice in Mandatory
Palestine was tailored to the realities of the colonies; as Binyamin Blum
Malcolm Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 673
(2018).
15
Fania Oz-Salzberger & Eli Salzberger, The Secret German Sources of the Israeli
Supreme Court, 3 Ind. U. Press 159, 159-60 (1998).
16
Criminal Law Ordinance 1936 (Isr.)
17
See Binyamin Blum, The Hounds of Empire: Forensic Dog Tracking in Britain and
its Colonies, 1888-1953, 35 LAW & HIST. REV. 621 (2017).
14
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explains, several forensic practices, such as the use of sniffing dogs 18
or establishing age on the basis of bone measurements, 19 were endemic
to the realities of the colonies and to their perception by the colonizers,
which was Orientalist at best and racist at worst.
Even assuming these limitations, the Ordinance did not even
come close to capturing the theory and logic of criminal law in a
common law system with centuries of caselaw. Judges and lawyers in
Mandatory Palestine had to keep up with British precedent to provide
interpretation and to fill the gaps in the statutory framework. This was
not mere custom; it was required by The King’s Speech at Council for
Eretz Israel, 1922-1947, which stated in Section 46 that British law was
to be mandatory precedent in the colony. 20
This dependence on British precedent remained in place after
Israel gained its independence. In the Ordinance of Government and
Legal Orders of 1949, put in place just as Israel became an independent
country, continuity and good order were guaranteed by preserving
legal institutions as they had been under British rule. Indeed, Section
11 reads: “The law that was in order in Eretz Israel on 14 of May 1948
shall remain in place, to the extent that it does not contradict this
ordinance or other laws given by the Temporary State Council or
according to it and with the appropriate changes.” 21 As a consequence,
and in order to maintain continuity, Israeli law continued to refer back
to British law for decades.
The strong British flavor of these decisions, however, faded
some over time. First, as the Supreme Court of Israel began issuing
criminal law precedents, it created its own case law, gradually
“Israelizing” subsequent decisions to build on these precedents. And
second, throughout the decades that followed, British law continued
to develop independently, and as legal doctrines began diverging,
British law became less and less relevant. Its relevance to criminal and
tort law, however, endured longer than in other legal disciplines:
during the 1960s, Israeli business law shifted away from British
doctrine and looked to the French and German codes for statutory

18

Id.
Id.
20
Dvar Ha’Melech BaMoatza 46.
21
Law & Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 7 (1948) (Isr.).
19
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inspiration. 22 Even when an Israeli penal code was finally enacted in
1977, it retained the cumbersome structures of British law, while
prominent Israeli jurists, Schneor-Zalman Feller and Mordechai
Kremnitzer, severely critiqued it and pointed to the advantages of
following continental legal principles, which they considered clearer
and more comprehensive. 23
B. The Fall of British Law
The late 1970s saw a pull away from British law, which was
partly inspired by the political upheaval of the 1977 election. The
election brought the Likud party, for the first time in the country’s
history, to political power; this move shook many of the old
hegemonies to the core. This political transformation, coupled with the
already undermined connection to British law, were the driving force
behind the enactment of the Foundations of Law Act of 1981. 24 The
new statute struck down Section 46 of the King’s Council, thus
severing Israeli law from its British counterpart, but keeping in place
the precedents that had been established based on this legal
dependency prior to 1981. In lieu of the recurrence to British law, the
sources of legal influence were listed in a hierarchical order provided
in Section 1 of the new statute: “If the court is faced with a legal
question that requires a decision and cannot find an answer in
legislation, case law, or by analogy, it shall decide in light of the
principles of freedom, justice, rectitude, and peace of Israeli Legacy.” 25
While connections to British law were now officially
dismantled, and comparative law was not explicitly mentioned, Israeli
case law continued to look outside its borders for influence. As
mentioned above, continental influence was already deeply evident in
Contract Law, 5727-1967 (Isr.).
Schneor Zalman Feller and Mordechai Kremnitzer, Proposal for a Preamble and a
General Part for the Penal Law – Changes Proposed by the Authors, 17 MISHPATIM
392 (1988).
24
Foundations of Law Act, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 181 (1980) (Isr.).
25
Section 1 of the Foundations of Law Act was amended in 2018 to explicitly
reference Hebrew law, generally understood to encompass Mishnaic and Talmudic
law, as a residual source of influence. The impact of religious Jewish law on modern
Israeli law had been a serious bone of contention in the Supreme Court in the 1980s
and 1990s, but elaboration on this topic exceeds the framework of this paper. Id.
22
23
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the structure of new business legislature, in particular contracts. But a
new light would emerge in the West as a strong source of influence –
American law.
C. United States Law Emerges
It is difficult to provide a definite explanation for the strong
appeal of U.S. law as a source of inspiration for Israeli jurists. In terms
of substantive attractiveness, one important feature is the existence of
a robust written constitution, which both British and Israeli law lack.
In Israel, the traditional explanation for the decision to make do with
“Basic Laws” in lieu of a constitution was the concern that the
heterogeneity of the population would make it difficult to agree on a
constitution, 26 though newer accounts attribute the hesitation to the
demographic threat. 27 But the United States features not only a
constitution that encompasses individual rights and governmental
structure, but also one that is regularly used and interpreted by the
Supreme Court in ways that are useful for a nation that purports to
value fundamental rights even when they are unwritten.
It is no coincidence that Israel turned to U.S. law. Pnina Lahav
dates the “American moment” in Israeli scholarship to 1967, when two
friends, Aharon Barak and Itzhak Zamir, returned to Jerusalem from
studying at Harvard. 28 The two academics were to become influential
figures in Israeli law, both in government and at the Supreme Court.
By the 1980s, Lahav argues, the academic enchantment with American
scholarship was such that “old school” academics, who valued British
and European models, warned against an Americanization of Israeli
academia. The younger Tel Aviv University was more keen on
adopting American educational reforms than the established Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, which was structured after the German
model, but even the latter would see changes in its scholarship,
doctrinal influences, and pedagogy in later years.
Harari Resolution, 5 Knesset Protocols 1743 (1950) (Isr.).
Aviram Shachal, “Protecting the Majority: The Constitution as a Blocking
Mechanism,” lecture at the 15th Annual Conference of the Israeli Law and History
Association, Nov. 26, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IvUC86_Avno.
28
Pnina Lahav, American Moment(s): When, How, and Why Did Israeli Law Faculties
Come to Resemble Elite U.S. Law Schools, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 653 (2009).
26
27
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What made the U.S. constitution especially attractive in the
criminal justice context was the Warren Court’s revolution of
fundamental rights, and particularly the incorporation of the
exclusionary rule against the states, which impressed Israeli academics
(who inaccurately identified it as Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine)
as a paragon of civil rights. Even after the Burger Court began to
reverse course and limit the reach of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments, other countries were fascinated by the ability to educate
and deter law enforcement through the admissibility of evidence. 29
The impact of the exclusionary rule, the Miranda warnings, and the
right to counsel, would be even more evident during the following
decade.
Another important factor was the rise in prominence of the
American legal system in popular culture. From the 1970s, as films and
television shows featuring American courtroom dramas appeared
more and more on Israeli screens, 30 the drama and excitement of
dramatic trials with juries (which are foreign to the Israeli context)
might have had something to do with the rise of U.S. law as an
inspiration.
Finally, there was the matter of convenience. U.S. law became
increasingly accessible due to the library system of cases, which
included methods of cross-referencing and Shepherdizing. Law
students in Israel were taught these systems as part of their university
library tours and were increasingly educated by faculty who did their
doctorates, or post-doctorates, in the United States—a quicker and less
onerous course of study than the one in Israel.
Proof of the rise of U.S. law during this era is hard, but citation
studies can provide a hint. In 1995, Yoram Shachar, Ron Harris, and
For more on these factors, see Part II.
Zionist leaders resisted importing series from the United States out of fear that the
nation’s idealistic spirit would be corrupted; in the 1960s, before the emergence of
cable channels, Israeli viewers had access to American television only by capturing
Jordanian television using their antennae. The struggle for more varied programming
content went hand in hand with the struggle to allow Israelis to purchase television
sets that could broadcast in color, which ended only in the late 1970s. See generally
Tasha Oren, Demon in the Box: Jews, Arabs, Politics, and Culture in the Making of
Israeli Television (2004); Shayna Weiss, Israeli Television: A history of a nation
through the small screen, My Jewish Learning, https://www.myjewishlearning.com/
article/israeli-television/.
29
30
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Meron Gross conducted a study of Israeli Supreme Court citations
between 1948 and 1994. 31 In 1948, Israeli opinions referred to British
sources 24.4% of the time and did not refer to any American sources.
By 1994, only 2.3% of citations were British sources, and the number of
American citations rose to 5.1%. Between 1982-1983, American sources
eclipsed British sources in terms of their relative frequency in the
decisions. 32

A notable record in American citations occurred during the
years 1992 and 1993, which saw American sources cited 11.4% and
12.0% in Israeli decisions, respectively. 33 A possible explanation of this
trend follows in Part II. But before examining the role of the early- to
mid-nineties in solidifying the eminence of U.S. law in decisions, it is
necessary to add a note about the extent to which the United States
itself sought influence in other areas.

Yoram Shachar et al., Citation Practices of Israel's Supreme Court, Quantitative
Analysis, 27 HEBREW U. L. REV. 119 (1996).
32
Id.
33
Id.
31
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D. A One-Way Trend
The United States was also, of course, a British colony.
Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to find references to British
law—or, for that matter, any foreign law—in American jurisprudence.
As Rebecca Lefler notes, “American courts have always been reluctant
to employ foreign decisions other than the historic English cases used
to explain common law roots.” Indeed, American isolationism is not
unique to the court:
[A]s Mathias Reimann has pointed out, “[i]n the
United States today, [international] comparative law
does not play nearly as prominent a role in teaching,
scholarship, and practice as one would expect in our
allegedly cosmopolitan age.” Bruce Ackerman has
noted that in a world where technology is making
worldwide information available at our fingertips,
“the global transformation has not yet had the slightest
impact on American constitutional thought. The
typical American judge would not think of learning
from an opinion by the German or French
constitutional court.” Instead, foreign law is treated as
inherently suspicious. John H. Langbein has
commented, “American legal dialogue starts from the
premise that no relevant insights are to be found
beyond the water’s edge.” Indeed, the works of the
U.S. Supreme Court confirm such observations. 34
American exceptionalism is not limited to scorn of foreign
authorities; it manifests itself clearly in criminal justice policies that set
the United States apart from other developed nations. The United
States is the only developed nation to retain the death penalty, de jure
and de facto; to offer lax gun control; and to incarcerate 1 of 100 of its

Rebecca Lefler, A Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case Law as
Persuasive Authority by the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of
Canada, and the High Court of Australia, 111 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERDISC. L.
J. 165, 166 (2001).
34
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inhabitants, a rate that puts it far above both developed and
developing nations.
Despite the problematic nature of the American criminal
justice system, the United States became embedded in Israeli
consciousness as an extremely pro-defendant, pro-due-process
jurisdiction. This explains its influence on litigation and legislation
during the Decade of Rights.
II. THE DECADE OF RIGHTS
The early 1990s were characterized by a fundamental
bifurcation between American and European-inspired legislative and
policy developments. In the area of criminal procedure, the perception
of the United States as a pro-defendant jurisdiction led to its imprint
on some monumental Israeli legal occurrences, the most significant of
which was the enactment of the Basic Law of Human Dignity and
Liberty, 35 followed by a decision by the High Court of Justice that
ordinary statutes could be declared void if they contradicted a
principle in said Basic Law. 36 The novelty of the new Basic Law was
that, by contrast to its predecessors from the 1950s, it addressed
fundamental rights, rather than the structure of government. In that
respect, this Basic Law was the equivalent of the United States’ Bill of
Rights, which was brought up in its legislative process. 37
The new Basic Law’s most relevant section to criminal justice
was Section 5, which reads: “it is prohibited to take away or limit a
person’s freedom through arrest, imprisonment, or in any other way.”
Like other sections in the Basic Law, violations of this section require
Knesset legislation enacted for a worthy cause and avoiding
disproportionate impact. 38 These requirements guaranteed judicial
review that monitored not only the values behind a limiting law, but
also its reach.

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992).
Civil Appeal 6821/93 Bank HaMizrachi HaMeuchad, Inc. v. Migdal, a Cooperative
Village, PD 49(4) 221 (1993).
37
Knesset Remarks, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, at https://main.knesset.
gov.il/Activity/plenum/Pages/SessionItem.aspx?itemID=160519
38
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, at § 9 (Isr.).
35
36
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It is no coincidence that Section 5 somewhat resembles the U.S.
Fourth Amendment. In the years preceding and surrounding the
enactment of the Basic Law, the leading academic authorities in Israeli
criminal justice, such as Ya’acov Kedmy and Eliyahu Harnon, tended
to portray U.S. search and seizure law as being extremely prodefendant. This was particularly evident in the Israeli conversation
around the exclusionary rule, which was regarded by Israelis much as
it was regarded by the Nixon administration: as an extremely
formalistic pro-defendant rule that might allow people to get off on
technicalities.
Israeli criminal justice textbooks of the era, both academic 39
and popular, 40 tended to confound the exclusionary rule with its U.S.
extension, the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree exception. 41 The distinction
in the United States is that the former refers to any evidence obtained
by unconstitutional means, whereas the latter refers to evidence
obtained through legal means, but whose roots can be attributed to an
unconstitutional action earlier in the chain of the police’s evidencegathering work. Israeli scholars of the 1980s and 1990s tended to merge
the two terms and refer to the American exclusionary rule as the “fruit
of the poisonous tree” doctrine.
But more importantly, as Binyamin Blum highlights in his
work on the exclusionary rule, Israeli academics and policymakers
tended to misperceive the American rule as having vast reach and no
exceptions. 42 At the time that these proclamations were made and this
sort of criminal procedure was taught in Israel, this had already been
untrue in the United States for at least a decade.
Nixon’s appointees to the Supreme Court had changed the
Supreme Court’s makeup enough to start eating away at criminal
procedure guarantees in general and at Fourth Amendment
protections in particular. The Court ruled that any disclosures to third
MOSHE SHALGI AND ZVI COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1981); Ya’acov Kedmy,
On Criminal Procedure – the Law in Light of Cases (1992).
40
SASSI GEZ AND MOSHE RONEN, CRIMINAL LAW – A GUIDE TO CRIMINAL LAW IN
ISRAEL (2001).
41
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920).
42
Binyamin Blum, Exclude Evidence, You Exclude Justice? A Critical Evaluation of
Israel’s Exclusionary Rule After Issacharov, 16 SW. J. OF INT’L. L. 385, 413 (2010).
39
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parties—friends, phone companies, and the like—were tantamount to
a relinquishment of the reasonable expectation of privacy protected by
the Fourth Amendment. 43 Broad exceptions to the warrant
requirement, in cases of search incident to arrest, 44 automobiles, 45
public arrests, 46 etc., were put in place. Even during the Warren
Court’s golden years, Earl Warren himself authorized a decision that
allowed warrantless stops and frisks based on considerably less
suspicion than the probable cause standard in the Fourth
Amendment, 47 which were expanded to car frisks 48 and home frisks 49
well before the Israeli codification of search and seizure rights. By the
1980s, U.S. academia had widely recognized the conservative shift in
policing and held conferences about it. 50 Even as early as 1972, Herbert
Packer himself—who had identified and hailed the Due Process
revolution in his famous book The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 51-expressed his despair over the failure of the due process model. 52
Israeli textbooks and policy documentation from the 1980s and
1990s were oblivious to this turn in policy. Those who supported
suspect and defendants’ rights hailed the U.S. system (as they
imagined it) as the way to guarantee proper police behavior, and
detractors highlighted concerns over guilty people walking free. This
controversy, with the idealized American comparator, characterized
another criminal justice debate: the fight over the validity of
confessions extracted through coercive means. Several years prior to

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979) (requiring warrants for a GPS tracking device); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745 (1971).
44
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
45
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
46
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
47
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
48
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
49
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990).
50
Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L. J. 185, 186 (1983); Hadar Aviram,
Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model, 36 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 237, 244 (2011).
51
HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, 245 (1968).
52
Aviram, supra note 50 at 244 n.1
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326

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 28

the High Court of Justice’s decision on torture, 53 Israeli courts followed
a pragmatic standard: confessions would be excluded only if the judge
thought that the method of obtaining them raised serious doubts as to
their truthfulness. 54 Importantly, the Israeli system relied not on
jurors, but on professional judges, whose discretion and ability to take
into account the context and value of the evidence was considered
better than that of laypeople. Therefore, the evidentiary system relied
on “weight”: judges would exclude confessions that they deemed
unreliable due to the circumstances of their provenance. With regard
to other types of unreliable evidence—statements from accomplices,
for example—evidence law required that they be supplemented by
other pieces of evidence, albeit minor in persuasive weight, from an
independent source. 55
One such independent piece of evidence would be a
defendant’s silence at the police station. Here, too, Israel diverted from
its perceived notion of U.S. law. Police officers in Israel were required
to give Miranda-like warnings to suspects, but their content was
slightly different: suspects in Israel would be warned that their silence
at interrogation could also carry negative repercussions. In
comparative discussions, Israeli scholars and lawyers would explain
that, while different from the U.S. solution to the problem of police
interrogations, this was an acceptable solution to the “trilemma” faced
by criminal suspects: while still risky, a suspect’s silence carried less
negative repercussions than a full or partial confession because it was
merely a “piece” of evidence that would be weighed together with

See HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government
of Israel 2 Isr LR 459, 459-460 (2006) (Isr.).
54
This doctrine was crystallized in a public report, chaired by Supreme Court Judge
Moshe Landoy in 1987, which examined the admissibility of confessions extracted
through torture. STATE INQUIRY COMMITTEE, LANDAU COMMISSION REPORT:
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION METHODS OF THE GENERAL SECURITY
SERVICE ON SUSPICIOUS HOSTILE ACTIVITIES 1 (1987), http://www.hamoked.org.il/
Document.aspx?dID=Documents1643.
55
Israeli evidence law defines three such additional pieces of evidence: hizuk
(“bolster”), siua (“assistance”) and dvar mah (“something”). See Evidence Ordinance,
New Version – 1971, § 54a for an explanation on which of these additions is required
for each type of testimony in a criminal case.
53
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other evidence, and thus would have a lesser contribution toward a
conviction. 56
The Israeli choice not to exclude confessions continued to be
deeply contested. In 2006, a case that had begun in military courts,
Issacharov v. the Military Prosecutor, finally found its way to the Israeli
Supreme Court. There, a Court operating four years after the new Basic
Law was in place decided to change legal doctrine and introduce a rule
that took a step toward an exclusionary rule. Under the Issacharov rule,
courts would have the discretion to exclude evidence obtained using
“interrogation methods that violate instructions or unlawfully violate
a protected civil right”, even if there is no concern about the
authenticity or validity of the evidence itself. 57
Issacharov was hailed by some defendant rights’ advocates—
importantly, practicing public defenders—as a major victory for civil
rights, in that it came closer to the shining American example of
fairness and police deterrence. 58 But the decision was also the subject
of considerable academic critique which, interestingly, revolved
around the perception that the Israeli Supreme Court did not go far
enough, and rather than adopting a discretionary standard akin to the
one in Canadian law, should have gone the full-exclusionary-rule
route, as in the United States. 59 Reading these critical opinions side by
side, especially through the lens of Yoav Sapir (later to become Israel’s
Blum, supra note 42, at 397.
CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. The Chief Military Prosecutor, PD 61(1) 461 (2006).
58
Inbal Rubinstein, The Revolution is Complete, 18 THE LAWYER 44 (January 2013).
Ofer Sitbon, An Interview with Dr. Yoav Sapir, the Incoming Public Defender, 4
MA’ASEI MISHPAT 39 (“In a situation of uncertainty, it seems to me easier and fairer
to align oneself with the side that says ‘don’t convict’ than with the side that asks for
a conviction”). Yoav Sapir, The Means Must be Justified, Too, 16 THE LAWYER 80
(January 2012) . Yoav Sapir, A Tradition of Protecting Rights in the Criminal Process
– Past, Present, and Future, 39 THE LAWYER 45 (April 2018).
59
Keren Shapira-Ettinger & Ron Shapira, The Israeli Exclusion Rule at the Margins
of Issacharov. 3 Din U’Dvarim 427 (2007). Boaz Sengero, The Exclusionary Rule for
Evidence Obtained via Wrong Means Develops, But Still Without Willingness to Pay
a Price (and Acquit a Guilty Defendant Who Is Still Alive), 4 Mishpat Al Atar 25
(2012). Yuval Marin & Rinat Kitai-Sengero, Collins, Miranda, and Issacharov—on
the Gap Between the Is and the Ought in the Issacharov Decision, 37 MISHPATIM 427
(2012). Binyamin Blum, Exclude Evidence, You Exclude Justice? A Critical
Evaluation of Israel’s Exclusionary Rules after Issacharov, 16 Sw. J. Int’l L. 385, 41516 (2010).
56
57
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National Public Defender) and Guy Rubinstein, 60 appears to be a
debate not about the merits of the Israeli decision, but about what the
U.S. exclusionary rule actually entailed. Sapir and Rubinstein argue
that the academic critique saw the U.S. rule through rosy eyes,
ignoring the post-Warren Courts’ contemptuous treatment of the
exclusionary rule and its diminishing contribution to defendants’
rights.
While Israeli solutions to these conundrums differed
somewhat from the American ones, their adoption reflects a deep
dialogue with the U.S. criminal justice system. This is even more
evident in the new arrest law adopted in Israel in 1996. 61 The new law,
inspired by U.S. reliance on warrants, expressed a strong preference
for judicial warrants for arrest, with only few exceptions for
emergency (coming close to the imagined U.S. doctrine, but in fact
being considerably more pro-defendant than that doctrine operated in
practice.) The law also considerably shortened the period of time
during which a suspect could be held before seeing a judge, requiring
that the Israeli equivalent of a Gerstein hearing be held 24 hours after
the initial arrest (with some allowances for Shabbat and holidays.) 62
The law’s rigidity had led to some perverse effects: rather than
shortening the period of pretrial detention, it led to its lengthening, as
officers who were unable to complete the investigation in 24 hours
repeatedly sought, and invariably received, dispensation for judges to
lengthen the detention. 63
Importantly, the reform in arrest law closely followed another
U.S.-inspired shift: the establishment of Israel’s Public Defender’s
Office. Prior to 1996, legal representation for indigent defendants in
Israel was provided through a legal aid model, similar to the one in the
60
Yoav Sapir & Guy Rubinstein, Issacharov’s Story: Issacharov in Action – On the
Relative Exclusion Doctrine and Its Contribution to Privacy Rights, 10 Ma’asei
Mishpat 333 (2019).
61
Criminal Procedure Act (Powers of Enforcement – Arrest) (Isr.).
62
Id. at § 29.
63
Hagit Lernau, A Recipe for Inefficient Legislation: The Case of the Arrest Law,
Public Defender’s Office, 2007, https://www.justice.gov.il/Units/SanegoriaZiborit/
Pirsumim/LernauHakika.pdf; Oren Gazal-Ayal & Dvir Yogev, Grim Thoughts on
Unnecessary Arrests, 234 HaSanegor 21 (2016); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Ra’anan Sicilliano
Keinan, Gal Einav & Atallah Shubash, Arabs and Jews in Initial Arrest Proceedings,
38 Mishpatim 627, 2009.
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UK. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, this system was savagely
criticized both by a Ministry of Justice committee 64 and by the Israeli
Supreme Court. 65 In 1993, a legislative effort to create a public defense
office started, spearheaded by then-Minister of Justice David Libai and
by Professor Kenneth Mann of Tel Aviv University. Mann, an
immigrant from the United States educated at Berkeley and Yale,
earned renown as an academic for his work on plea bargains (an area
studied extensively in the United States at the time, but not in Israel), 66
and brought other U.S. innovations into Israeli legal education, such
as legal clinics. 67 After the establishment of the public defense in
1995, 68 Mann was appointed its first National Public Defender. The
structure of establishing indigence, and the relationship between a
pared-down “insider” staff, consisting of 100 lawyers and 160 nonlawyer employees, and a larger, supervised cadre of “external”
attorneys, were also U.S.-inspired. 69
These U.S.-inspired reforms were, however, limited to the
areas of criminal procedure and criminal practice. By contrast, the area
of substantive criminal law, more doctrinal and theoretical by nature,
deliberately deviated from the fascination with U.S. law, and retained
the more traditional European influences. Israel’s original penal code
was derived from a British Mandate ordinance and substantive
criminal law decisions frequently cited British precedents well into the
1970s. A considerably overhauled new penal code was introduced in
1994, 70 and was inspired by German law rather than by U.S. law. It was
The Public Defense: A History, Ministry of Law Website, https://www.
justice.gov.il/UNITS/SANEGORIAZIBORIT/ODOT/Pages/History.aspx.
65
In Criminal Motion 353/87 State of Israel v. Ifargan et al. (1987) Judge Goldberg
wrote that the state “did not think to create, alongside the court’s duty to appoint
defense attorneys for Respondents, also tools that would enable it to comply with said
duty.” Even more explicitly, in Criminal Appeal 134/89 Abargil v. the State of Israel
(1989), Judge Dov Levin wrote that “if only it were possible to establish, side by side
with the general prosecution that represents the state, also a general-public defense at
the defendants’ service, that would be the desired solution that would be useful to the
defendants but also to the law and justice apparatus.”
66
ELIYAHU HARNON AND KENNETH MANN, PLEA BARGAINS IN ISRAEL (1976).
67
Efrat Rosental, Social Responsibility: The Work of the Legal Clinics, Megafon (Jan.
12, 2014), http://megafon-news.co.il/asys/archives/196100.
68
Public Defense Act, 5756-1995 (Isr.).
69
The Public Defense: A History, supra note 64.
70
Penal Law, 5754-1994 (Isr.).
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drafted by two academics that had consistently expressed admiration
for the orderliness and clarity of German criminal law, and abhorrence
toward the “gaming season” that characterized the plea-bargaining
trade in the United States. 71
One possible reason for the distinction between substantive
criminal law (influenced by the German code) and criminal procedure
(influenced by the perception of U.S. law) might be the strong doctrinal
orientation of Israeli legal scholars at the time. The law and society
field, active in the United States since the late 1960s, was still nascent
in Israel; empirical studies were mostly conducted by sociologists and
criminologists who had little influence on the Israeli legislative field.
Legal scholars, by contrast, were invested in normative conversations
about civil rights, and might have been captivated by the Warren era
rhetoric, rather than by the post-Warren courts’ interpretation of the
Bill of Rights. Notably, despite the German nature of the penal code,
references to U.S. law in substantive criminal law cases, and in other
areas, continued to characterize much of Israeli litigation and judicial
decision making. These would increasingly look to the West for
punitive innovations in criminal justice, adopting them as soon as they
became known in Israel, and often after empirical evidence in the
United States already undermined their promise. We turn to these
next.
III: THE HEYDAY OF LAW AND ORDER
During the late 1990s and the 2000s, Israeli policymakers,
academics, and lawyers made multiple propositions for criminal
justice reform which leaned heavily on the U.S. penchant for punitive
reforms. As during the Rights Decade, this phase also evinces
enthusiasm about everything American, but it is qualitatively different
from the previous schema. While the Decade of Rights saw fascination
with a formal, inaccurate perception of U.S. law based on an outdated
and naïve reading of the Warren Court’s work and ignorance of its
subsequent undoing by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the Heyday
of Law and Order saw fascination with actual practices in the United
States, seeing these reforms for what they were. These policies tended
Mordechai Kremnitzer, Making Criminal Procedure Suitable to the Goal of Truth
Finding, or Is It Not Time Yet to End the Gaming Season, 17 MISPHATIM 475 (1988).
71
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to be more practice-oriented, and they also tended to lean in the
opposite direction than the exclusionary rule: they were law and order
reforms designed to increase law enforcement efficiency, restrict postconviction remedies, and award crime victims more punitive power.
A micro-analysis here is necessary: often, innovations would
emerge in Israeli law enforcement as “imported goods” by academics
with strong American connections. In the case of Israeli policing, such
an academic was David Weisburd of the Hebrew University’s Institute
of Criminology, who worked closely with police departments in the
United States on reform based on situational crime prevention.
Weisburd consulted with Israeli police on the implementation of
community policing, COMPSTAT, and “hot spot” responsiveness. The
osmosis of these reforms into Israeli police culture were quicker than
their implementation in the United States because, by contrast to the
United States’ 40,000 police departments, Israel employs a national
police force. While some of these policing techniques, particularly the
various forms of community policing, held some promise, 72 some of
them, such as COMPSTAT, had already garnered mixed reviews in the
United States when they were implemented in Israel, and the resources
and infrastructure they required were not available in Israel. 73
A more complicated story involves the introduction of victim
rights advocacy into the Israeli scene. Victims were always at the
forefront of the Israeli conversation regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, with military widows and orphans occupying center stage as
symbolic representations of the sacrifices involved in the conflict. 74
Moreover, the Institute of Criminology at Hebrew University
regularly taught a victimology course, based on a considerable
heritage of scholarly interest: Menachem Amir’s Patterns of Forcible
Rape, 75 published in 1971, which examined victim-offender relations
and provoked controversy in identifying risk behaviors for victims
Danny Gimshi, A Basic Plan For Strategic Implementation of Community Policing
in Israel (1995).
73
Maya Goldschlag and Ofer Shabtai, The COMPSTAT Program at the NYPD and Its
Implementation in Israel, 1999-2000, 6 POLICE AND SOCIETY 135 (2002).
74
Victor Florian, Asa Kasher and Ruth Malkinson, Public and media perception of
bereaved families in Israel: A national survey, 2 MEGAMOT 280 (2000); Edna
Lomsky-Feder, From Agent of National Memory to Local Mnemonic Community: The
School Memorial Ceremony for Fallen Soldiers, 3 MEGAMOT 353 (2003).
75
Menachem Amir, Patterns of Forcible Rape (1971).
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and defining “victim-precipitated rape”, a concept which feminist
critics interpreted, understandably, as victim blaming and a form of
absolving sexual assailants. 76 More understanding of victims’
perspectives was Leslie Sebba’s Third Parties, 77 which was already
attentive to the increased American attention to the topic: victim billsof-rights, victim consultation obligations at various steps of the
criminal process, and the difference between the prosecutors’ public
duties and the victims’ interests. But victims of domestic crime came
to occupy a prominent role in the criminal justice conversation only in
2001, with the enactment of the Rights of Crime Victims Law. 78 Uri
Yanay and Tali Gal attribute this important development to the
formation of a coalition of victims’ rights organizations, which focused
particularly on women and children. 79 These organizations reached
out to academics in the field, organized Israel’s first conference on
victims’ rights, and lobbied the Public Attorney’s Office to support a
legal enshrinement of victims’ rights in the criminal process.
A further development was the establishment of the Noga
Center for Victims’ Rights at the legal college in Kiriat Ono in 2004. 80
Dr. Dana Pugach, the founder of the Center, was educated in the UK,
where she witnessed little to no exposure to issues of victims’ rights
and no engagement with the American literature on the topic. 81
Transitioning to advocacy from academia, Pugach shaped the Center
as a legal-therapeutic hub of services for victims, the first of which was
a call-in emergency number. In addition, the Center operated two legal
clinics, one for representing victims in serious criminal trials and one
for operating a helpdesk for other victims at a lower court. But the
Noga Center would soon become an important player on the national
Id. For an example of how Amir’s terminology continues to fuel feminist discourse
today, see Lilia M. Cortina et al., Beyond Blaming the Victim: Toward a More
Progressive Understanding of Workplace Mistreatment, 11 Indus. and Organizational
Psychol. 81 (2018).
77
LESLIE SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES: VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996).
78
Rights of Crime Victims Law (2001) (Isr.).
79
Uri Yanay & Tali Gal, Lobbying for Rights: Crime Victims in Israel, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF VICTIMOLOGY 373, 379 (Paul Knepper et al., eds.)
(2010).
80
Noga Center for Victims’ Rights, https://www.ono.ac.il/academy/social-agenda/
noga-center/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
81
Email from Dr. Dana Pugach (August 13, 2019, 2:08pm EST) (on file with author).
76
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stage, submitting proposals to the Knesset and offering legal opinions
on initiatives pertaining to victims.
Many of the Noga Center’s legal achievements echoed
developments in the United States. In 2007, they succeeded in lobbying
for a legislative amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code that
would allow victims to submit a statement for sentencing (prior to the
amendment, this option was available only for victims of sex
offenders). 82 The Center also contributed, as amicus curiae, to a
Supreme Court decision to allow crime victims in certain cases to
appear physically before the parole board. 83 Both of these
accomplishments for victims echoed U.S. developments in the prior
two decades. In 1982, President Reagan convened a Task Force on
Victims of Crime, which recommended over a hundred reforms aimed
at making the victim heard at all critical stages of the criminal process.
In the same year, California voters approved Proposition 8, known as
the Victim’s Bill of Rights, which required reaching out to the victim
for an impact statement prior to sentencing and at parole hearings.
This was not the first time that victims’ perspectives were allowed in
court and at a hearing. Since the 1920s, various jurisdictions
introduced victims’ statements through probation officers’ reports,
and some California counties, such as Fresno, allowed victims to speak
even before victim allocution became part of the state’s penal code.
By the time these developments were implemented in Israel,
the U.S. criminal justice field was already divided as to their value.
Some writers, such as Douglas Beloof, were strong supporters of a
voice for victims in the process; Beloof, inspired by Herbert Packer’s
classic two models, posited a “third model” of the criminal process. 84
By contrast, Kent Roach’s Four Models of the Criminal Process, written
in 1999 as a variation on Herbert Packer’s 1968 classic, 85 posited two
Amendment 187 Criminal Procedure Code (Isr.).
Permission for Criminal Appeal 10439/08 State of Israel v. Samir Ganameh et al.
84
Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of the Criminal Process: The Victim
Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1999). Many years later, Beloof would
coauthor a piece with Pugach comparing American and Israeli victims’ rights
“packages” and arguing that the latter need more remedies: Douglas E. Beloof & Dana
Pugach, Comparing Modern Victims’ Rights in Israel, 8 INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES IN VICTIMOLOGY 11 (2014).
85
Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of Criminal Sanction, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 237, 245
(1968).
82
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models of victims’ rights: a punitive model that “affirms the retributive
and expressive importance of punishment and the need for the rights
of victims to be considered along with the rights of the accused” and a
non-punitive model that “attempts to minimize the pain of both
victimization and punishment by stressing crime prevention and
restorative justice.” 86 While both models, Roach explained, were
aimed at increasing respect for victims, “the punitive model focuses all
of its energy on the criminal justice system and the administration of
punishment while the non-punitive model branches out into other
areas of social development and integration.” 87 The victims’ rights
movement had opted for the former model rather than the latter,
which prompted praise from some 88 and deep concern from others. 89
Perhaps the best achievement of punitive victims’ rights
advocates was the passage of a series of bills involving restrictions on,
and the registration of, sex offenders. The first bill to pass, in 2001,
required public employers in settings involving minors or people with
disabilities to request any prospective employees to bring an approval
from the Israeli police department that they have not been convicted
of a sex offense. 90 Even though the Knesset approved a framework for
implementing the law, 91 the law was not effectively implemented; two
years after its passage, the Commission for Child Safety found out that
none of the summer camps in Jerusalem ever asked their prospective
employers for police certification. 92 The procedure for obtaining a

Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGy 671, 676-82 (1999).
87
Id. at 673.
88
Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victims’ Movement: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 4-10 (1984).
89
Austin Sarat, Vengeance, Victims and the Identities of Law, 6(2) SOC. & LEGAL
STUD. 163, 181 (1997); Edna Erez, Victim Participation in Sentencing: Rhetoric and
Reality. 18 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 19, 28 (1990); Lynne Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s
Rights, 37 STANFORD L. REV. 937, 1020-21 (1985).
90
Law Preventing Employment of Sex Offenders in Particular Institutions, 57712011, HH (Knesset) Amend. 7 (Isr.).
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Zen Read, Law: Sex Offenders Will Not Work with Minors, HA’ARETZ (Apr. 2,
2003).
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Ruthie Sinai, The Law to Prevent Employments of Pedophiles Is Not Being
Implemented, HA’ARETZ, July 9, 2003.
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clearance certificate was delineated only in 2013, 93 including a list of
institutions that would present an employment challenge that ranged
from schools and hospitals to zoos, playgrounds, and swimming
pools. In 2010, the law was amended to include a vaguely defined
residual category. 94
In 2004, a second bill allowed criminal courts, upon conviction
of a sex offender, to forbid the convict from residing, working, and/or
studying in the area where the victim resides. 95 This, as Pugach
explains, was a practical measure in addressing the plight of particular
victims. 96 However, under the bill, the court can place such restrictions
in response not only to a prosecutor’s request, but a victim or a victim
representative—reflecting the growing importance of the Noga Center
and other organized victim advocacy initiatives. This bill, as well,
drew ire because of the lags in its implementation, leading some
neighborhoods to inquire about the possibility of advertising photos
of convicted sex offenders around the neighborhood to prevent the
“wave of pedophiliac attacks.” 97 After a two-year drafting process, in
2006, the Law for Defending the Public from Sex Crime Perpetrators,
was enacted 98--a comprehensive bill that created a “risk assessor”
position, and required that courts, prisons, parole boards, psychiatric
release boards and other decisionmakers receive a risk assessment
about a person convicted of a sex offense before making decisions
about their sentence, placement, or release. More importantly, the bill
required the Minister of Internal Security to establish a “supervision
unit” that would make recommendations to the court as to the need
93
Law Preventing Employment of Sex Offenders in Particular Institutions, 57712011, HH (Knesset) Amend. 7 (Isr.).
94
Ministry of Educ., Dir.’s Memo no. 3.7-65, Guidelines for Implementing the Law
Preventing Emp’t of Sex Offenders in Particular Inst., 2011. The proposal also
prevented sex offenders from accessing porn and using Viagra: Ruth Sinai, The Law
Seeks Ways to Inhibit Evil Sexual Inclinations, HA’ARETZ (Aug. 1, 2002), https://
www.haaretz.com/1.5158523.
95
Law Limiting Sex Offenders from Returning to the Vicinity of the Victim, 2004.
96
Dana Pugach, “The Day After”- New Approaches in the Legal System for Risk
Management of Sexual Assault – From Punishment Only to Supervision and
Prevention, 51 HAPRAKLIT 89 (2011).
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Again, HA’ARETZ (Feb. 18, 2004).
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for supervision of particular sex offenders. Courts, in turn, can issue
an order requiring sex offenders to comply, which involves entering
their names into a registry. The registry, for a maximum, but
renewable, period of five years, would be open to law enforcement,
risk assessors, and military authorities, but not to the public.
The natural comparison made in the discussion of these bills
was the U.S. sex offender registry, which is open to the public through
Megan’s Law. 99 The Israeli registry deliberately deviated from the U.S.
model, 100 because, as explained in Ha’aretz newspaper—
Sources in the Ministry of Justice say that the system in
the United States and in the United Kingdom has
utterly failed, and according to [these sources] led to
harassment of sex offenders. They explain that public
information sends a message to the public that they can
take the law into their own hands, and that led to the
commission of crimes, such as arson, against the sex
offenders. The message, the sources explain, should be
that the state takes care of the public and does not
abandon the public to take care of itself. Therefore,
there should be a confidential governmental registry,
which will enable surveillance and control of the
pedophiles and grant the state the authority to search
the offender’s home and other limitations. 101
Indeed, other journalistic reports about the U.S. registry
highlighted its negative aspects, concluding that online access to the
whereabouts of sex offenders “has ended in murderous crusades.” 102
The story shows a cautionary tale and highlights the deliberate aspect
of the Israeli divergence:
Jonathan Simon, Megan’s Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America,
25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1111 (2000).
100
Zen Read, Online Information about Sex Offenders – Not in Israel, HA’ARETZ
(Nov. 10, 2006).
101
Yuval Yoaz & Yuval Dror, Israel Learns Lessons from U.S.: A Pedophile Registry
Will Be Established, But Not Publicized, HA’ARETZ (Aug. 6, 2004).
102
Yanay Goz, A New American Website Warns of Sex Offenders’ Place of Residence,
THE MARKER (Nov. 10, 2006).
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Less than a month ago, a new unit of the prison
authority devoted for supervising released sex
offenders started operating in Israel . . . . In the first step
. . . the unit will register 130-150 released offender. In
the next step, all sex offenders that hurt minors, about
700 people, will be registered. So far, no one is
discussing notifying the public, and certainly not
establishing a website. 103
Additional stories highlighted difficult clashes about values
and policies in the context of U.S. litigation regarding the
constitutionality of various aspects of Megan’s Law: “Is the status of
sex offenders different from that of other criminals in a way that
justifies their separation from society for life, even after they complete
serving their sentences?” 104
But not everyone agreed that disclosing the names was a bad
idea. In a different journalistic story, which preceded the 2004 bill,
Professor Immanuel Gross was quoted saying that “in balancing the
individual’s interest in rehabilitation and privacy with the
community’s right to be protected from him, the community’s interest
prevails.” The complexity of drafting the bill led Itzhak Kadman, the
Director of the Child Safety Commission, to comment, “true, it is a
complicated subject, but we’ve lost three precious years, and in the
meantime, every year, at least 5,000 children are sexually hurt.” 105
The public debate about the registry intensified as the public
became aware of the problems in implementing the modest Israeli law.
In May 2007, Ha’aretz newspaper reported serious lags in the
identification and registration of sex offenders. The story relied on
information from the Ministry of Health, according to which the
delays occurred both at the clinical risk assessment level and at the
court order level. 106 It also reported an unpleasant exchange at the
103

Id.
Nathan Guttman, Once a Sex Offender, Always a Sex Offender? HA’ARETZ
(November 10, 2002).
105
Ruthie Sinai, Punishment Has Increased to Protect the Public, HA’ARETZ (May 20,
2002).
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Shachar Ilan, No Supervision of Dozens of Dangerous Sex Offenders in the Process
of Release, HA’ARETZ (May 28, 2007).
104

338

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 28

Knesset Committee for Legislation, in which the Chair chided the
prison mental health authorities for the delays. A further scathing
critique of the government’s failure to properly protect the public
ensued when Ha’aretz reported that the government asked the
Knesset to delay the starting time for the supervision legislation. 107
Kadman accused the relevant governmental offices, who “had almost
two years to prepare for the law’s implementation and failed”, of
“serious misdeeds.” The delayed proposal met with harsh opposition
across the political spectrum and was canceled a day later. 108
Against this backdrop of calls for improved public safety, KM
Eli Aflalo proposed a Bill for Fighting Pedophiles, 109 which was
endorsed by the government. 110 The proposal was a much more
Americanized approach to sex offender supervision in two major
ways: it advocated for a public registry, accessible online a-la Megan’s
Law, and for court-ordered medical treatment of sex offenders using
chemicals such as testosterone blockers. 111 Under the proposal, the
treatment would be mandated, in addition to a prison sentence, and
would require the convict’s consent. Consenting convicts would
receive a two-year sentencing discount, in addition to their parole.
The proposal was not without its detractors: KM Shelly
Yechimovich argued that “there is a clear boundary in punishment in
an enlightened country and it passes right where you don’t maim a
person as punishment or as means of prevention.” Yechimovich
compared the incentives for chemical castration to the custom of
amputating thieves’ hands in Saudi Arabia. 112
Detraction came from outside the Knesset, too. Shortly after
the preliminary approval of the bill, the Israel Bar published its
opinion, in which it stressed the need to consider “the public need—

Ruthie Sinai, The Government Is Trying to Delay Supervision of Sex Offenders Who
Attacked Children, HA’ARETZ (July 18, 2007).
108
Ruthie Sinai, The Government Has Recanted Its Effort to Delay Sex Offender
Supervision, HA’ARETZ (July 19, 2007).
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Public Protection of Sex Offenders Act, 3 Tevet 5766–2006, https://fs.knesset.gov.
il//16/law/16_lsr_299947.pdf) p. 234 (Isr.).
110
Shachar Ilan, The Government Supports a Bill, Approved Preliminarily, for
Chemical Castration of Pedophiles, HA’ARETZ (October 17, 2007).
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on one hand, and the potential harm to offenders who finished serving
their sentence—on the other.” 113 The Bar offered its support for
arranging the rehabilitative process of sex offenders
and returning them to society, [insofar as it is]
conditioned on the consent of the offender”, but
offered strong opposition to a public registry, arguing
that it “violate[d] the spirit and aim of the Criminal
Record and Expungement Law of 1981, to limit access
to criminal records so as to minimize the expected
harm to rehabilitated offenders. 114
They expressed concern about a “slippery slope . . . an
increased demand to expose criminal records of other offenders” 115
and, importantly, pointed out that “against the real, harsh
consequence of an eternal Mark of Cain . . . the practical experience of
similar registries in other countries shows that their efficacy in
neutralizing the public risk of sex offenders is marginal.” 116
The National Public Defense was even more resolute: in their
written opinion they “vehemently oppose[d] the proposed law” 117
which, they argued was “legislation influenced by social anxiety.”
They explicitly identified the new law as an “effort to import the
American ‘Megan’s Law’” and stated that, since its enactment in the
United States,
there has been enough research evidence to enable us
to critically examine the bill. The conclusions from the
studies are unambiguous: there is no place for the
proposed registry in legislation, both because the

Ravit Zilberfarb, The Israel Bar’s Position on the Bill to Fight Pedophiles—2006,
and the Bill for Preventive Rehabilitation—2006, ISRAEL BAR, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
FORUM.
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Id. at 3.
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registry is ineffective and because of its severe
violation of human rights. 118
After its preliminary approval by the Knesset by a majority of
24 to 4, the bill shifted to the Legislative Committee, 119 where it led an
erratic life. The Committee discussion in 2008 featured the following
endorsement from the bill’s proposer, KM Eli Aflalo:
In research that we’ve done we found that most
enlightened countries in the world have such a
registry. There are some countries where it is even
more extreme, like the Netherlands and other
countries, where a pedophile has to fly a flag over the
house where he lives. I don’t suggest adopting this
extreme path and I don’t want to say this is the final
solution . . . but I argue that we have to take all
measures. 120
Not everyone agreed with KM Aflalo’s perception of
comparative law. The Committee’s legal advisor, Efrat Rosen, said:
“We must examine whether this is an issue in which it is appropriate
to follow the United States.” She added that research done in the last
few years showed various problems, such as a false sense of security
among the public and ineffectiveness in preventing repeat sex
offending in the community. 121 Aflalo then clarified:
I want to say that my impression is—and if it isn’t so, I
apologize—that it is all over the world. I did say at the
beginning that there are surveys that said there are
some things that are maybe not alright, but it’s a fact

Id. at 3.
The 156th Meeting of the 17th Knesset, p. 80 (Isr.).
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that in all the places it continues to operate and it
operates. 122
By 2010, the proposal had been bifurcated into two new bills:
a chemical castration bill from 2009 and an open registry bill in 2010. 123
At the Committee’s discussion of the new version, the chair, KM David
Rotem, opened by explaining that a third aspect of sex offender
policy—rehabilitation—was not included in the bills. KM Moshe
Matalon replied that the bills had come up before the Knesset several
times, “made headlines”, and then the proposing legislators were
regularly “accused of populism.” 124 In the discussion, the proponents
stressed that medical treatment would be voluntary, albeit resulting in
lighter sentences, and that treatment options could range from
chemical treatment in prison to therapeutic options in the community.
What provoked considerable discussion was whether it was
appropriate to open the registry to the public. The Ministry of Justice
representative, Amit Marari, stated the Ministry’s position against
opening the registry:
[T]he responsibility to prevent sex offenses is [on] the
state and not the private citizen. We would not want a
private citizen to feel obligated to enforce the law. We
are aware that people would want to know who their
neighbor is and whether he committed a sex offense,
but in the balance of interests we think this is the right
balance. I also have to say that the open registry, and
that is the lesson from places that have an open
registry, can increase the dangerousness of sex
offenders in that it prevents them to rehabilitate, it
leads them underground and raises their level of
dangerousness. 125
To which KM Aflalo interjected: “according to a survey that
was done it actually triggers them to come and get the treatment. It’s
Id. at 17.
Transcript no. 192 of the Session of the Legislation Committee, May 10, 2010 (Isr.)
124
Id. at 4.
125
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the opposite.” And KM Matalon added: “this is something worth
discussing.” 126
Kadman offered critique of the breadth of the existing registry.
He said that “our registry, as opposed to other countries, is not open
to the public, but at least for those who need to know, the registry has
to also include low risk sex offenders.” Marari interjected that “they
can get this information from the [general] criminal registry. There are,
after all, two registries.” 127
Dr. David Cohen from the Health Ministry explained that
there is enough documentation that these registries can
trigger other offenses. One thing they do is that sex
offenders who return to established neighborhood,
when the neighborhood is very organized and there
are resources to put pressure on them, move to weak
neighborhoods, where they can disappear into the
population unnoticed. 128
Following the committee discussion, the Attorney General’s
office compiled a memorandum with policy questions regarding
access to the registry. 129 Among the questions raised was the rank of
police officers that could access the registry 130 and questions regarding
the possibility of notifying schools and community centers of a nearby
residence of a sex offender in special cases. 131
The latest version of the proposal was submitted for an early
reading in 2016. 132 This last version would entrust the registry to the
Courts Administration and declared it open to the public. Offenders
willing to accept chemical treatment would be removed from the
registry. 133 The registry categories would include a physical
description, the offender’s address, identification number and drivers’
Id. at 13.
Id. at 29.
128
Id. at 32.
129
Attorney General’s Office, Key Points for the 13th Discussion of the Law to Protect
the Public from Sex Offenders (March 1, 2011).
130
Id. at 2.
131
Id. at 3.
132
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license number, a description of the offense, including the age and sex
of the victim, and in special cases, the offender’s workplace address. 134
The proposal is still awaiting discussion by the Knesset.
The conflict among policymakers over the power of the U.S.
example—whether it is an argument for adopting the public registry
simply because it is done in the United States, or for abandoning it
because it is ineffective there—was reflected in litigation as well. In
2012, the Haifa District Court heard a lawsuit in which a convicted sex
offender who returned to reside in his kibbutz after release asked for
an injunction against a TV channel that was going to broadcast a story
about his crimes. 135 Judge Ron Sokol found for the defendants, arguing
that the newspaper articles about the plaintiff made his complaint
about additional publicity moot; but he “found it appropriate to
remark that the issue of publicizing identifying features about a sex
offender who finished serving his sentence is a complicated question,
which has not yet been answered in Israel.” 136 The judge recounts the
history of Megan’s Law legislation in the United States, offers an
analysis of the public interest in publication, and then briefly
summarizes the research that critiques open registries, citing an article
by Dana Pugach, cofounder of the Noga Center. 137
The sex offender registry example is illustrative in several
ways. First, it shows how law-and-order heyday policies tend to focus
on the fact that a particular policy exists in the United States and are
vaguer about how the policy fares in its country of origin. Second, it
demonstrates that, in this period, legislators know that their proposals
are (to them, unjustly) perceived as populistic. Third, and most
importantly, it shows that even during the heyday of law and order,
the extreme U.S. versions of victim advocacy were not uniformly
embraced by Israeli policymakers. We see academic supporters and
advocates for victims’ rights finding nuances, including support for
victims whose opinions about the criminal process are nonpunitive. 138
Id. at 1.
CC (HI) 45296-05-12 Ofer Carmi v. Channel 10 and Immanuel Rozen, PM 5772
(2012).
136
Id. at 4.
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We see strong opposition by legal officials—not only the public
defense and private attorneys, but government advisors—that
extensively rely on critical research conducted in the United States.
This opposition, fueled by policymakers educated in, and influenced
by, U.S. academic institutions, is a counterintuitive “policy transfer”:
the transfer of negative perspectives on U.S. policy via elite
networking of academics and policymakers. The influence of this
group of stakeholders on Israeli criminal justice would increase in the
following decade, blooming into an “era of contention” and retreat
from the United States as a role model.
IV: THE ERA OF CONTENTION
The declining infatuation with criminal justice in the United
States is evident in four ways: First, there is a decline of fascination
with U.S. law and order policies and a tendency to view the United
States as more of a cautionary tale. As a consequence, both in
committee hearings and in academic texts there is much reliance on
the U.S. mass incarceration literature. The best example of this is the
rejection of privatization of prisons, which rightly or unjustly, is
perceived as contributing to the crisis. Second, and related, the United
States-inspired reforms that get adopted are trends that the U.S.
adopted to curb its incarceration appetite, such as community courts.
Third, there is inspiration in anti-incarceration litigation, which can be
seen in the recent successful case against prison overcrowding. The
litigation techniques here are an impressive mix of United Statesinspired arguments and fresh new angles (square area per prisoner
versus number of prisoners). Fourth, there is an increased appetite to
look away from the U.S. and toward other countries, such as
Scandinavian nations, as inspiration for policy, such as with
prostitution.
One example of the Israeli divestment from the U.S. example
occurred in the course of the legislative project to introduce
determinate sentencing. The original determinate sentencing bill from
2006 included a proposal for establishing a committee that would set
an “initial sentence” for each offense, akin to the limited ranges created
Pugach, Pain, Love, and Voice: The Role of Domestic Violence Victims in Sentencing,
18 Mich. J. Gender & L. 423 (2012).
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by sentencing commissions in many U.S. states and by the U.S. federal
government. 139 On December 5, 2011, the Knesset discussed a proposal
by the Constitution, Legislation, and Law committee to sever the
sentencing commission issue from the remainder of the bill. The
Knesset approved the proposal and future versions of the bill did not
include it. 140 Judge Ami Kobo, in recounting the history of the law,
explained that “this part provoked the lion share of critique of the bill,
as critics argued that ‘initial sentences’ would narrow judicial
discretion in sentencing, contradict the principle of individualized
punishment, and shift[] the decision-making power away from the
courts and toward plea bargaining negotiation.” 141 Notably, these
concerns were compounded by the concern that “initial sentences”
would lead to “improper ‘punishment tariffs’, and simultaneously to
a considerable and improper increase in sentencing severity as with
the sentencing guidelines in the United States.” 142
In lieu of “initial sentences,” the final bill 143 left sentencing
discretion in the hands of the judge, but required judges to justify the
imposed sentence using the following structure: first, the judge would
establish the “appropriate range” of sentencing based on a retributivist
logic; then, he or she would consider whether it is appropriate to
depart from this range for rehabilitation reasons (downwards) or for
protecting the public (upwards); if such departures were not available,
the judge would then justify the length of the sentence within the
appropriate range; and finally, situations involving multiple offenses
or offenders would be considered. The limitations on judicial decision
making in each of these steps were fairly minimal; a “public
protection” upward departure from the self-imposed “appropriate
range” would require a showing of the defendant’s considerable
139
In some U.S. states, the appropriate range is set by a professional sentencing
commission, and calculated using the defendant’s criminal history and the severity of
the offense. In other states, the mandatory sentences or ranges are set by the
legislature, sometimes via voter initiatives. For a good primer, see Alison Lawrence,
Making Sense of Sentencing: State Systems and Policies, National Conference of State
Legislatures (2015), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/sentencing.pdf.
140
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criminal history, or other criteria as set up in a professional report
(which could include the probation report).
This watered-down version of determinate sentencing is a
clear departure from the various types of determinate sentencing
adopted in the United States in the late 1970s and 1980s. Much of the
U.S. literature on determinate sentencing describes it as the outcome
of a bipartisan push, a description that dovetails with recent literature
highlighting the share of liberals and professionals in mass
incarceration 144. But at least in California, the bill generated
considerable—and prescient—opposition from the left and even from
within the system. Numerous organizations predicted that
determinate sentencing would lead to harsher sentencing across the
board, and submitted letters to Governor Jerry Brown, then on his first
term, urging him not to sign these changes into law. Some examples of
prescient commentators include California Attorneys for Criminal
Justice (“[t]he inescapable reality of this change is the absolute
certainty of never-ending effort to increase terms”) 145 and the ACLU
of Northern California (“sentence escalation will become a popular
legislative pastime”). 146 Indeed, the proponents and opponents of the
Determinate Sentencing Act reflected a dichotomy between politicians
and prosecutors, elected officials who felt accountable and vulnerable
to the public on public safety matters, and professional parole officers,
therapeutic professionals, and other employees in the gigantic
California rehabilitation machine, who until then could toil in relative
obscurity and opaqueness, relying on their professional legitimacy and
immunity from critique. In the United States, the shift toward
determinate sentencing represented a triumph of the politicalemotional paradigm over the professionalized one; the Israeli version
represents a conscious decision not to go that far.
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Another successful marshalling of the U.S. experience as a
cautionary tale was the failed effort to introduce prison privatization.
Talks on prison privatization in Israel started in the early 2000s,
already prompting critique and warnings from academics and civil
rights organizations. Political scientist Yoav Peled invoked the
American experience as a cautionary tale pointing out that “serious
studies” conducted in the United States concluded that “there is no
proof that prison privatization yields significant savings for the
state.” 147 He also mentions that “in the United States, the sentencing
increase that led to the doubling of the number of prisoners between
the mid-80s and the mid-90s was partly the outcome of overt lobbying
efforts by private prison companies” and that “in the United States, in
many cases it has been heard that the prison authorities took
unjustified disciplinary measures against inmates to prevent the
opportunity for their early release for good behavior.” 148
However, the Interior Committee meeting that yielded the
initial bill was full of praise for the United States experience. Shmuel
Hershkovitz, Director of the Internal Security Ministry, said,
I personally visited two prisons in the United States,
and I have to say that if that’s a prison, I don’t know
what a prison means. They weren’t putting on a show
for me, because I toured there alone with the staff. The
impression is that it’s an approach that focuses on
preserving the dignity of the prisoner and saving the
state’s budget. 149
Knesset Member Hemi Doron was less optimistic: “We can see
lots of journalistic articles and exposés about horrible things that
happen in private prisons in the United States.” 150 Aviv Vasserman, an
attorney working civil rights cases at a legal clinic, was incensed:
147
Yoav Peled, Crime Pays: What Can Be Learned from the American Experience in
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There are papers by the American Department of
Justice and leading research institutions in the United
States which wrote in 1999, after 15 years of experience
in the field, that this business doesn’t save the state
costs, it brings about a decline in the quality of guards,
both in terms of personal quality and of salaries, and it
leads to more turnover among the staff. 151
It is telling that the discussion then turned to the question of
differentiating the Israeli proposal from the U.S. model. Herzl Yusuv
said,
everyone is talking about the American model, in
America, as in America, they always go to the extreme
and we’re not there at all. We know the American
model, it is much broader, gives broad authority to the
contractor, and we need the British model that
incorporates strict state supervision of what happens
in the prison. 152
Judge Telgam responds, “the American study is a comparative
work of dozens of studies that were conducted, and it provides the
Comparison.” 153 Yusuv replies, “I studied the American model.
Everyone who argued that the shift was justified, they claimed he
represented the private corporations. Everyone who argued against it,
they claimed he was ideologically motivated.” 154
In 2004, the full Knesset was presented with a bill to allow
privatization of prisons. 155 The Knesset assembly to discuss the bill
was extremely contentious. KM Muhammad Barakah of the left-wing
party Hadash argued that “some things cannot be subject to
competition and capitalization.” 156 Avraham “Bayga” Shohat objects:

Id. at 20-1.
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 45.
155
Draft Bill for Privatization of Prisons, 5764-2004, HH (Knesset) No. 28 (Isr.).
156
Divrei HaKnesset, 123 meeting of the 16th Knesset, 41.
151
152

2021

BAD ROLE MODELS

349

“[Then] why is it good in England? I saw it in England.” 157 Zahava
Gal’on retorts: “The fact that you saw this in England doesn’t mean it
works. I’m going to say something in a minute about the British and
the Americans.” 158
She proceeds:
There is prison privatization in England and prison
privatization in the United States. But despite this
popularity . . . no country has been able to establish
whether privatization was a good idea. And why they
haven’t been able to establish—and th[ese] are things I
read from experts on the subject—is because there is a
very, very big difficulty in isolating and critiquing the
many variables that influence the economic and social
outcomes involved in such privatization . . . it is not at
all clear . . . in the United States whether prison
privatization led, in the long run, to considerable
savings for the state. 159
She proceeds to explicitly repudiate the American reliance on
prison privatization:
In the United States the private prison industry has
been operating for the last 20 years. Because of their
lobbying, which aims to guarantee them a steady
supply of inmates—I want the Knesset to know this—
in California today minors are serving life without
parole for stealing a hat or a videotape, in an adult
facility.
So I suggest we don’t deceive ourselves. First you
introduce private companies and allow them to
operate private prisons . . . and later we’ll find
ourselves standing here in the Knesset an[d] asking
how we caused this. We privatized prisons, because
there’s a cost benefit thing and the country is in
Id. at 43.
Id.
159
Id. at 45.
157
158
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financial distress, but what’s going to happen in the
end? Who is going to be put in there? Will they now
put minors who stole a videotape into a prison with
adults? Is that the situation we want to bring about?
...
Another thing I want to bring to the Knesset’s
attention: Even though officially the Internal Security
Office, who appeared before the committee, refused to
disclose the details on the American companies that
are in the running [to operate the private prisons], in a
journalistic interview two of the three companies were
exposed. I want you to know that these corporations
have a history with the prisons they operate in the
United States . . . there have been massive rape cases
within prisons, both for female inmates and for female
guards, in the same prisons they run; there’s been a
mass escape of 500 inmates from one prison; and they
established prisons that were regarded drug dens.
Suddenly this has become much worse. We have here
prisons that the state runs. I haven’t heard . . . and I
hope I won’t hear of such cases of rape of inmates, of
guards, in prisons. 160
Despite these efforts, the amendment passed. 161 The new law
drew ire from civil rights organizations, which sued the Ministry of
Justice. Their attorney, Effi Michaeli of the Israel institute of
Democracy, pointed out that the new law was “a meaningful step
reflecting a right-wing economic policy.” 162 He, too, expressed
concerns about the inappropriateness of correctional authorities for
privatization. Importantly, he points out that
many studies in the Western world reflect harsh
phenomena of rights violations of inmates held in
private prisons around the world, because of lack of
Id. at 45-6.
Id. at 91.
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capabilities of the private profiteer’s employees, their
lack of experience, and the economic considerations
that accompany the decision making of the authority
that operates the privatized prison. 163
Similarly pessimistic was journalist Arye Dayan, who
extensively invoked the negative experiences in the United States, 164
and attorney Aviv Vasserman, who wrote for Yediot Aharonot:
Even assuming that full privatization is a reasonable
solution, the Israeli bill allows for all the familiar
problems from the similar move in the United States.
It enables, not to say incentivizes, the negative
phenomena that were found in the international
experience, and to the extent that any caveats were
accepted they were marginal. 165
On November 19th, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled not to
allow the private prisons to operate. 166 The Court relied on
constitutional arguments, finding that the amendment violated the
freedom of movement, guaranteed in Article Five of Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Freedom. 167 The decision reflects a quasiEuropean sensibility for rights discourse, which was absent from the
U.S. policymaking debate about prison privatization. Importantly, the
effort to present the court with policy evaluation studies from the
United States failed. Chief Justice Beinisch found that “even though
concerns raised by petitioners are not baseless, they concern a future
human rights violation, the potential of which is uncertain; and
therefore it is doubtful whether it can serve as constitutional
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foundation for striking down a Knesset law.” 168 More specifically, the
Chief Justice observed that
the petitioners’ argument about the impact of prison
privatization in other countries (and especially in the
United States) is insufficient for an apriori decisive
finding of this court, according to which the mode of
operating prisons through private management will
necessarily lead to a more significant violation of
human rights than in public prisons . . . partly because
the legislative arrangement in Israel differs from those
in other countries . . . and partly because the
comparative data itself is indecisive. 169
By contrast, the decision relies on the notion that the very
transfer of correctional power from the state to private hands is a
violation of basic state obligations, and in so deciding, the Court relies
on U.S. scholarship, particularly on John DiIulio’s assertion that “It is
not unreasonable to suggest that employing the force of the
Community via private penal management undermines the moral writ
of the community itself.” 170 But this is philosophical scholarship about
the nature of privatization, and the Court is careful to point out that
“American courts have not established, so far, which of the different
legislative agreements in the United States that pertain to prison
privatization is unconstitutional” 171 even though privatization itself is
“hotly debated.” 172
The Minister of Treasury, Yuval Steinitz, aggressively
criticized the decision at the Israel Business Convention, arguing that
the Court exhibited “budgetary abandon.” 173 But he found himself
almost singlehandedly attacking the decision. The Ministry of Justice
was not required to respond and even Netanyahu, in meeting Chief
Id. at 56-7.
Id. at 57.
170
Id. at 62.
171
Id. at 97.
172
Id. at 99.
173
Adi Ben-Israel, Steinitz accuses courts of “economic anarchy” - “The Knesset is
authorized to set economic policy, not the courts,” the finance minister declared,
Globes (Dec. 19, 2009) https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1000522516.
168
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Justice Beinisch, repudiated Steinitz’s critique. 174 Pinhas Rubin, a
business lawyer writing for the business newspaper Globes, said that
this is appropriate for a country that seeks basic rights
. . . in the competition between the budget and
fundamental freedoms, the freedoms prevailed, and
their violation was found to be disproportionate and
unconstitutional. This is the enlightened governance
we chose and wanted to live in. 175
Steinitz’s critiques pointed out that the state, which explicitly
asked the Court not to issue a temporary injunction, took a risk by
allowing the private company to build the first prison on speculation,
and was therefore liable for the outcome. 176
The Knesset committee meeting to discuss the ramifications of
the Court decision was heavily protested by the employees hired by
the private contractor, who had left their places of employment to join
the new venture. The contractor himself attended the meeting,
expressing bitterness that “the Supreme Court murdered my dream
for prisoner rehabilitation . . . this prison had adopted as its motto the
issue of prisoner rehabilitation.” He also reportedly asked “why does
this system succeed in most prisons in the world and in Israel it is
thought that it will fail.” 177 Eventually, the Prison Service purchased
the private prison from the entrepreneur and started operating it in
2010. 178
Another development repudiating the U.S. legacy of
incarceration was the 2015 report by the Dorner Commission on
Punishment Policy and Offender Treatment, which, ironically, was
178F
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convened because of public outcry about the leniency of sentences. 179
Established by Minister of Justice Ya’acov Ne’eman and chaired by
retired Supreme Court Justice Dalia Dorner, the Commission was
comprised of a variety of professional stakeholders: representatives of
the prosecution, defense, correctional authorities, police, and several
academics. Several of the participants—academics Oren Gazal-Ayal
and Kenneth Mann and public defender Yoav Sapir—attended
graduate school in the United States. Another key participant, deputy
public defender Hagit Lernau, an experienced academic and
policymaker, had written a criminology textbook titled Crime and Law
Enforcement, 180 which devoted an entire section to the United States
mass incarceration crisis, not only because of its centrality to the
penological literature, but because she saw it as an important
cautionary tale for Israeli lawmakers, professionals, and policymakers.
The story told by the Dorner Commission echoed the story told
by the National Research Council (“NRC”) commission of 2014. 181 The
Dorner commission was not exactly the Israeli counterpart of the NRC
committee, which was comprised of academics piecing together the
history of mass incarceration. The conclusions, however, were
remarkably similar. Committee Chair Jeremy Travis expressed
concern that “the United States is past the point where the number of
people in prison can be justified by social benefits” and urged to
consider “a criminal justice system that makes less use of incarceration’
and more use of “common sense, practical steps . . . in that
direction.” 182 The committee report recommended reexamining
mandatory and long-term sentences, at both the federal and state
levels, and a reconsideration of the punitive war on drugs. The reform
principles recommended by the NRC report were very similar to the
180F
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Sharon Pulwer, Israeli Panel Calls for Shorter Jail Terms, Improved Rehab for
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and Steve Redburn eds. 2014).
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Dorner commission’s recommendations: Chief among the sentencing
considerations would be proportionality, supported by parsimony
(the minimal sentence necessary to achieve sentencing goals),
citizenship (leaving an opening to restore one’s civic status) and social
justice (equity and fairness in punishment.) 183 The report highlighted
the uneven distribution of incarceration, and its adverse impact on
already disadvantaged communities.
Even though the Dorner commission report does not cite the
NRC report, its recommendations are remarkably similar. As its chief
recommendation, it touts a principle of proportionality between
severity and punishment and finds that “increasing the statutory
penalties does not advance the war on crime and in general is not
recommended as a means for that end.” 184 But importantly, from the
onset, the report singles out the U.S. correctional project as an example
of poor implementation of retributive philosophy: “While modern
retributivist theory . . . supported much more lenient sentencing than
existing ones, its application in the United States, and to a great extent
in other common law countries, led to an increase in sentencing
severity.” 185 The report proceeds to compare the rise in incarceration
rates in the United States and in Israel, finding a similar pattern of
exponential growth, albeit on different scales.
The Dorner report excoriates some of the main features of
punishment severity in the United States and urges the Israeli
legislature not to follow in their path. In doing so, the report heavily
relies on U.S. literature critical of the punitive turn. Accordingly, the
report relies on behavioral literature to critique deterrence, insofar as
it serves as a rationale for harsher sentencing, opting instead for
improving apprehension odds. 186 The report also relies on situational
crime prevention—the works of Weisburd and others in U.S.
settings—to suggest that prevention is more effective than
punishment. 187 A particularly interesting aspect of the report is its
revision of Robert Martinson’s classic article concluding that “nothing
National Research Council, supra note 181, at 323.
The Public Committee Examining the Punishment and Treatment of Offenders,
supra note 4, at 4.
185
Id. at 3.
186
Id. at 20.
187
Id. at 21-22.
183
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works” in prison rehabilitation. Relying on newer research conducted
in U.S. settings, the Dorner report concludes that some evidence-based
programs work, and more importantly—that effective rehabilitation
can be achieved in community settings as well as in correctional
ones. 188
Another interesting feature of the Dorner commission was its
recommendation to support and implement one particular U.S.
innovation: community courts. 189 The report recommended
expanding the pilot program for such courts by picking appropriate
judges and establishing a case management system that would
consistently refer cases to these unique courts. The special courts were
pioneered by Joint-Ashalim, a public-private collaboration between
the Israeli government, the Joint Israel nonprofit, and the New York
Jewish Federation. 190 Daniella Beinisch, an academic-turnedpolicymaker, wrote her doctoral dissertation about U.S. problemsolving courts and brought those insights to Joint-Ashalim. In 2014,
two courts were established, in Ramla and Be’er Sheva, and in 2016,
the government decided to expand the program and inaugurate two
more. Other Israeli scholars interested in problem-solving courts, Tali
Gal and Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg, learned about them by conducting
a taxonomy of U.S. courts. 191
The Dorner report also discussed the pathologies of mass
incarceration, such as its criminogenic effects and the threat to basic
dignity. As an example, the report cites Brown v. Plata, arguing that
“the rise of the prison population required confining them in
overcrowded, difficult conditions. As a consequence, the United States
Supreme Court found the correctional system unconstitutional and
ordered the release of 46,000 prisoners.” 192
This part of the report was not unrelated to developments in
Israel. In 2014, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI)
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 38-39.
190
Together in Doing Social Work for Young Children and Young People in Risk
Situations (trans. by author), About Ashalim, http://www.ashalim.org.il/about.
191
Tali Gal and Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg, Characterizing Community Courts, BEHAV.
SCI. L. 1 (2007).
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Report to the Minister of Justice, supra note 4, at 27.
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petitioned the High Court of Justice to alleviate the overcrowding in
Israeli prisons. 193 The overcrowding issue had been mentioned before,
in committees formed in the late 1970s and 1980s, and was frequently
brought to public attention through the Public Defender’s annual
reports. Particularly notable was the 2013 Public Defender’s report,
devoted to the issue of overcrowding, 194 which stated that Israel
accorded each inmate approximately 3 square meters of living space,
contrasted with an average of 8.8. meters in western countries. Page 4
of the report offers numerous comparators and depicts Israel as an
outlier, but notably does not list the United States among the western
countries. 195 The same trend repeats itself when measuring number of
inmates per cell. 196
The report’s divergence from the U.S. path is evident not only
from its choice of comparative role models, but also from its choice of
the unit of measurement for overcrowding. The Plata litigation
addressed the overall number of prisoners in the correctional system
compared to the system’s design capacity, and the resulting order
required the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
to release enough inmates to achieve a 137.5% occupancy. 197 By
contrast, the Israeli measure, used in other European countries,
assesses overcrowding using square meterage per inmate or number
of inmates per cell. This measure is, arguably, a much better indicator
of the conditions of incarceration and their immediate impact on the
inmates’ quality of life. Indeed, in December 2017, Nick Jones
calculated the occupancy in California prisons in the supposedly Platacompliant era. He found no less than 15 state prisons were still
overcrowded, because the Plata measures pertained to the system as a
whole, rather than to individual institutions. 198 Measuring
overcrowding by territory has the additional advantage of enabling
comparisons between inmates in different institutions; indeed, as the
HCJ 1892/14 ACRI vs. the Legal Advisor to the Government (decided Feb. 2,
2017).
194
Public Defender’s Office, Prison Overcrowding in Israel, July 2013.
195
Id. at 4.
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statement of facts by the Court explains, while a minority of inmates
enjoyed 4.5 square meters, most of them were housed under much
more crowded conditions, with more than 40 percent of inmates living
in less than three meters per person. Another advantage of this
measurement is that it allows for a discussion of each inmate’s
territorial share in common areas, such as bathrooms and showers—
notably, in Plata, the calculation method obfuscated the fact that many
of these inmates were housed in triple bunks in formerly public areas
of the prison, such as the San Quentin gym. 199
The petition was colored, from its inception, by the state’s
efforts to avoid a court mandate. The correspondence between the
parties reflects multiple reports arguing that the prison authority was
in the process of constructing prisons, and the petitioners’ replies that
these long-term administrative promises were inadequate as solutions
for the immediate problem. 200 While the decision itself refers to the
challenge to dignity in the abstract, one of the petitioners’ lawyers,
Sigal Shahav, coordinator of the criminal justice clinic at the Academic
Center for Law and Business in Ramat Gan, illustrated the problems
in an article for Ha’aretz following the decision:
Such overcrowding increases the conflict between the
prisoners and the violence and illness in the prison.
These difficult conditions compound other problems:
old, decrepit structures, some of them with serious
moisture problems; lack of proper ventilation causing
extreme temperature; in some correctional institutions
the showers are located above crouching bathrooms,
and sometimes the bathrooms and showers are
separated from the cell by a mere curtain; because of
the poor hygiene conditions there is a pest problem
that hurts the prisoners. 201

Laura Sullivan, San Quentin’s Gym Becomes One Massive Cell, NPR (July 7, 2008,
11:43 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92296114.
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An example of the shifting inspiration sources can be found in
a story in Ha’aretz newspaper from 2017, which reports of a Belgian
method for reducing overcrowding: Belgian inmates alternate
between a week in prison and a week at home, enabling two inmates
to “occupy” one bed by rotation. 202
The decision in the overcrowding case led to a legislative
release valve. The Prison Ordinance had already been amended in
1993 to create a release valve during overcrowded periods. 203 The Act
to Amend the Prison Ordinance [Temporary] 2018 created an
additional mechanism for shortening prison sentences, in the event
that overcrowding persists despite the valve. The new amendment
categorized prisoners by the length of their sentences, stating an
incarceration term for each category. 204 As the Act was being
proposed, a uniquely Israeli wrinkle unfolded: A story in Ha’aretz
newspaper alerted the public to the fact that the new early release
regime would set free 300 “security prisoners” – Palestinians convicted
of terrorist acts. 205 As a consequence, the bill was amended, and the
final excluded people incarcerated for terrorist acts. 206
As with the Plata litigation, the prison overcrowding decision
met compliance challenges at the prison level. In August 2018,
Ha’aretz reported that prisoners at Ma’asiahu prison complained that
nothing in their incarceration conditions had changed after the
decision, and that their efforts to sue the state for the violations were
met with retaliation and sabotage by prison personnel. 207 The state’s
Shlomo Papirblatt, Belgian Inmates Go Part Time: Spending a Week in Prison and
a Week at Home, HA’ARETZ, Oct. 11, 2017.
203
Prisons Ordinance Amendment (No. 13) (Administrative Release), 5753-1993, HH
No. 1426 p. 126 (Isr.).
204
Prisons Ordinance Amendment (No. 18), 5760-2000, HH No. 1752 p. 284 (Isr.).
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Josh Breiner, Israel Expected to Free 300 Palestinian Prisoners Due to
Overcrowding, HA’ARETZ (Oct. 6, 2018, 10:15 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/
israel-news/israel-expected-to-free-300-palestinian-prisoners-due-to-overcrowding1.6532340.
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lack of compliance with the timetable set by the Court was the source
of additional litigation. Moreover, ACRI continued to press the state,
through the courts, about the implementation of the decision on socalled “security prisoners”, leading to a set of specialized solutions for
this inmate population. 208
The prison overcrowding litigation represents a mature and
complicated approach toward the U.S. example. First, it reflects
reliance on the American correctional landscape as a cautionary tale
rather than an inspiration. At the same time, it represents a
sophisticated approach toward U.S. civil rights litigation, adopting
some important tactics such as prison documentation and
international comparison and rejecting others, such as the measuring
unit for overcrowding. It also reflects the increasing reliance on
university clinics—a model of legal education adapted from U.S.
schools—as important hubs of civil rights litigation. And finally, it
reflects a healthy interest in locating alternative role models and
sources of penological inspiration.
This last issue is evident in another example from the era of
contention—the Act for Prohibition of Prostitution Consumption. 209
The law created an administrative offense, Consuming Prostitution,
punishable by a considerable fine. 210 The Act modified legal status of
sex work in Israel: the Penal Code never explicitly prohibited
prostitution in itself, but it did criminally proscribe “keeping a place
for the purpose of prostitution.” 211 The original purpose behind the
offense was to target pimps and exploiters of sex workers, while
leaving the sex workers themselves out of the criminalization
framework; indeed, Supreme Court decisions from the 1990s
instructed lower courts to interpret the offense according to the social
purpose of eradicating the pimping phenomenon. 212 But the
ACRI, Overcrowding in Prison and Arrest Facilities in Israel—Update, August 8,
2008.
209
Prohibition on Prostitution Consumption Law (Temporary Order and Legislative
Amendment), 5779-2019, HH No. 1258 p. 58 (Isr.).
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Criminal Appeal 2249/92 Hertzl Gavison v. the State of Israel, available on Takdin,
https://www.takdin.co.il/searchg/%D7%A2%20%D7%A4%202249%2092%20%D7
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unintended consequence of the offense was the frequent
criminalization of sex workers who worked from home. 213 Ironically,
more sex workers were charged under the law that was meant to
protect them than pimps 214, perversely incentivizing sex workers who
hoped to avoid prosecution to work in the unprotected streets.
But even this poorly designed legal arrangement was better
than its U.S. counterparts, which criminalize both sides of the sex work
transaction in all states but one. 215 In Nevada, ten counties legalize
prostitution if conducted in a “licensed house of prostitution.” 216 All
other states place the sex workers themselves under threat of
incarceration, with the possibility of more severe sentencing for repeat
offenders. 217
The Israeli proposal explicitly rejected this aspect of the U.S.
model, affirming its commitment to the view that sex workers were
exploited, vulnerable victims, rather than criminal perpetrators.
Following the Nordic Model, 218 the Israeli law explicitly targets clients
of sex workers, including recipients of “lap dances” at strip joints, and
in the future is designed to offer an educational alternative to the fine
in the form of a “John school” equivalent (a privately provided
workshop for sex work consumers already operates in Israel.) 219
Importantly, the Swedish model is not clean of doubts. Naomi
Levenkron, an expert on sex work policy and one of the new law’s
%95%D7%9F%20%D7%A0%20%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%AA
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213
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Oct. 7, 2014.
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216
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critics, points out that Sweden actively promotes client criminalization
around the world and appointed a special consul for this purpose. 220
She also explains that the Swedish police not only arrest clients, but
also notify landlords about sex work occurring in their home, with the
unfortunate consequence of eviction or increased rent for the sex
workers themselves, who continue to provide sex services under more
vulnerable conditions. 221 Levenkron expresses doubts about the
powers of a criminal sanction in the face of “the simple fact that men
continue to rape, murder, and sexually harass regardless of the
existence of legal prohibition.” 222 She finds irony in that
at a time in which feminism has liberated itself from
the burden of law, excoriated the legal system, and
turned to lynching rapists and harassers in the
Facebook town square, it finds it appropriate to subject
the women it regards as most vulnerable in society to
a system it regards as patriarchal, oppressive, and
discriminatory. 223
Levenkron’s important critique notwithstanding, it seems that
the social ills she identifies would be considerably worsened by
adopting the U.S. model, which criminalizes the sex workers
themselves.
This last point is generalizable to much of the criminal justice
reform characterizing the Era of Contention. The Israeli solutions to
problems such as sentencing disparities, prison overcrowding, and sex
work, are not ideal, but they represent a clear trend of departure from
blindly following United States reforms. U.S. criminal justice policy is
either clearly rejected or adopted and then departed from. When U.S.
criminal justice inspires, it is often in its adoption of alternative or
dissenting ideas, such as community courts, john schools, and prisoner
rights litigation. This recent trend of awakening calls for a broader
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inquiry into the similarities between the two countries, which might
explain why it has come so late in the process.
As with the heyday of law and order, the era of contention
reflects a policy transfer via both emulation and elite networking. Both
the punitive proposals and their nonpunitive alternatives are
emulations of trends existing in the United States, which is not
uniformly punitive: community courts and sex worker customer
reeducation exist side by side with private incarceration and
mandatory minimums. Moreover, supporters and opponents of
punitive policies alike appeal to their familiarity with the U.S. system,
either by explicitly mentioning visits to the United States or by
signaling familiarity through the comparative materials cited.
A remarkable aspect of the Era of Contention is the increasing
influence of U.S.-educated academics on local controversies about
policymaking. It is impossible to overestimate the impact of American
legal education, particularly in the areas of critical legal studies, law
and society, and critical writings about penology, on the Israeli
academic scene. As mentioned above, Pnina Lahav identifies several
stages in the “Americanization” of Israeli academe, 224 culminating in
its “peak” from 2008 onward—the advent of the “era of contention.”
Unsurprisingly, the arguments made by opponents of punitive U.S.
policies echo American scholarship, and come from empirical legal
studies, behavioral economics, critical legal studies involving gender
and race, and the fields of law. What is especially interesting about
Israelis returning from studying abroad is that not all join academia,
and many of the people educated in the United States return to Israel
to assume senior positions in government and policymaking, at the
Ministry of Justice, the National Public Defender’s office, and various
clinical centers at the heart of litigation. Far from simplistically
representing the end of the United States “policy transfer” moment,
this era reflects a complicated relationship with U.S. criminal justice,
in which Israeli elite networking that acts against adopting U.S.
policies is in itself the product of American critique of the same policies
in their country of origin.
Pnina Lahav, American Moment(s): When, How, and Why Did Israeli Law
Faculties Come to Resemble Elite U.S. Law Schools?, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN
L. 653, 658 (2009).
224

364

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 28

V: SIBLINGS IN DEVELOPMENT
A.
Applying U.S. Political Development to Criminal
Justice
What can the two models of policy transfer teach us about the
United States, Israel, and their interrelationship? The most important
thing is that “criminal justice policy” is not a monolith, and that
tendencies to adopt U.S. policies, as well as conscious decisions to
deviate from them, are both done in reference to the United States.
Different stakeholders in Israel have different ways of relating to U.S.
policies: lawmakers seeking legitimacy and public support rely on
American-inspired rhetoric devices, such as a claim of rising crime and
danger to the public, whereas elite professionals, such as U.S.educated criminal justice academics and senior policymakers, tend to
glom onto the critical writing in the United States to oppose the
adoption of unhealthy policies.
But why the United States, of all places? The answer might lie
in the literature problematizing the perception of the United States as
a developing country in the context of criminal justice. In the Slate
magazine column “If It Happened There”, Joshua Keating narrates
current events in U.S. politics using the journalistic style usually
associated with reporting events in foreign countries. Here, for
example, is Keating’s rewriting of the firing of James Comey:
The surprise dismissal of a powerful security services
chief Tuesday night is widely seen here as a part of
strongman President Donald Trump’s efforts to
sideline critics and consolidate power, raising concerns
about the state of democracy and the rule of law in this
fragile but strategically vital North American country.
...
Still rated “Free” by the nongovernmental monitoring
organization Freedom House, the United States is
fiercely proud of its democratic tradition and the
independence of its judiciary. When Trump, an
ultranationalist former oligarch who has in the past
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questioned the motives of judges who rule against
him, took power in January, many experts feared his
tenure could erode the influence and independence of
America’s democratic institutions. So far, most of those
fears have not come to pass, as some of Trump’s most
controversial initiatives have been blocked by the
judiciary and the legislature. But a key legislative
victory early this month—rolling back most of the
previous regime’s health care initiatives—as well as
this latest purge have reignited concerns among
opposition leaders that the country’s weakened
institutions may not be enough to rein in Trump’s
ambitions. 225
The humorous effect of Keating’s column comes from the fact
that the author describes a country that self-identifies as a first world,
developed international leader, using the paternalistic, quasianthropological language usually used by first-world reporters to
describe developing countries. But the outcome is thought provoking:
Is there a real qualitative difference between United States politics and
those of developing countries?
In the last three decades, American Political Development
(APD), a subdiscipline of political science, has employed qualitative
methods to examine the historical development of American politics.
Rogan Kersh defines the discipline as follows:
APD focuses on the causes, nature, and consequences
of key transformative periods and central patterns in
American political history. More than other political
scientists, APD scholars look to historical processes to
analyze governing structures and policy outcomes,
and to build theories about political change. More than
most historians, APD analysts draw on evidence from
the past to illuminate broad questions about today’s
Joshua Keating, If It Happened There: Political Chaos as Regime Purges Powerful
Security Chief, SLATE (May 10, 2017), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/
05/10/how_would_the_u_s_media_cover_james_comey_s_firing_if_it_happened_in
_another.html.
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U.S. polity and its idiosyncratic institutional features.
APD researchers may also be distinguished from most
historians by their willingness to advance
comprehensive theories about American institutions,
particularly the national state, and about
governance. 226
Some of the questions that APD scholars are interested in
pertain to some sociopolitical aspects of life in the United States which,
compared to other developed nations, seem to lag behind. For
example, John Skrentny’s The Minority Rights Revolution 227 examines
the 1970s efforts toward racial equality in light of previous events, such
as the aftermath of World War II and the Iron Curtain. Similarly, Paul
Frymer’s Black and Blue 228 and Karen Orren’s Belated Feudalism 229 both
discuss the historical and political causes for the weakness of the U.S.
labor movement. Frymer shows a policy of “divide and conquer”
between racial rights and labor rights, and Orren shows a disconnect
between labor governance and democratic politics. But the APD
engagement with issues of class and race has, so far, failed to
encompass issues related to the criminal justice system, which has
heavy implications for the failure to achieve class and racial equality.
In his keynote address at a Boston University symposium,
Malcolm Feeley sought to harness insights from APD to understand
criminal justice. 230 As Feeley argues, APD tends to rely on explanations
of fragmentation and “weak state” to explain U.S. failures of creating
a robust and functioning welfare policy. Applying these insights to the
criminal justice area requires some modification. Feeley argues that,
throughout its history, American criminal justice policy has been
consistently described as failing to achieve its goals, but largely so
because it has been compared to industrialized Western nations,
Rogan Kersh, The Growth of American Political Development: The View from the
Classroom, 3 PERSP. POL. 335, 335 (2005).
227
JOHN SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1st ED 2002).
228
PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT,
AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2008).
229
KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).
230
Malcolm Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform, 98 BU LAW REVIEW
673 (2018).
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particularly Western European countries, and specifically Nordic
countries. 231 These countries are typically regarded as “developed
countries,” or the “global North”, and contrasted to “developing
countries” or “the global South”, which are characterized by political
instability, high level of interpersonal violence, wide gaps in income,
and painful histories of slavery and racial oppression. 232 Feeley’s
unflinching gaze on the two categories of countries leads him to
conclude that “by many of the indicators I have set out above, the
United States is ranked well below Western Europe, and toward the
Latin American end of the spectrum.” 233
While valuable as a rhetorical statement, Feeley’s observation
is also valuable as offering an explanatory tool. The many failures of
criminal justice reform in the United States—police violence,
courtroom dynamics, the bail system, and the sentencing system—are
easier to understand when drawing analogies to South American and
other developing countries who suffer from similar problems. The
source of the criminal justice system’s resistance to reform can only be
found if we
dig deeper and seek to understand [it] in light of the
culture and governmental structure. No serious
diagnosis of the problems of education, public health,
and criminal justice administration in developing
countries occurs without its being anchored in an
appreciation for the weaknesses in governmental
structures. Similarly, too, I suggest, diagnosis of the
obstacles in the American criminal process must be

Chris Weller, Dutch Prisons are Closing Because the Country is So Safe, THE
INDEPENDENT, May 31, 2017, at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
dutch-prisons-are-closing-because-the-country-is-so-safe-a7765521.html (discussing
Nordic countries tend to be idealized for their humane penology); Christina Sterbenz,
Why Norway’s Prison System is So Successful, BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 11, 2014,
at https://www.businessinsider.com/why-norways-prison-system-is-so-successful2014-12, but cf Vanessa Barker, Nordic Nationalism and Penal Order: Walling the
Welfare State (2017) (discussing closer look reveals problematic nationalistic trends
emerging from recent waves of immigration).
232
Feeley, supra note 230, at 729.
233
Id. at 729-730.
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anchored in a broader understanding of the failures of
public administration and governmental structures. 234
B. Israel and the United States. as sibling developing
countries
Feeley’s striking observation has important implications
beyond U.S. criminal justice. There is an established body of
scholarship that analyzes Israeli law in general, and Israeli criminal
justice in particular, as products of Israel’s political development and
colonial legacy. In Argonauts of the Eastern Mediterranean, 235 Asaf
Likhovski marshals historical examples to show how Israeli adoption
of foreign policies was not merely a rational examination of the
advantages of comparative legal structures, but also an act carrying a
considerable symbolic load. Relying on Eric Posner’s ideas about
norms as a form of signaling and on David Nelken’s ideas about
adopting foreign norms as tokens of willingness to cooperate
internationally, Likhovski explains two policy decisions—the IsraelHarvard project of the 1950s and the Israeli aid to Africa in the 1960s—
as efforts to alleviate the “anxiety of influence” related to Israeli law,
which in the 1950s was an amalgam of Islamic, Frenchh, and English
norms and institutions. But the remedy for this eclecticism was even
more eclecticism—seeking “the most advanced [legal] thought and
best [legal] experience wherever it may be found.” 236 This comparative
approach made Israel appear cosmopolitan and dressed up its
eclecticism as forward-thinking originality and openness to
considering (albeit not blindly accepting) models from other countries.
Likhovski explains that Israel’s heterogeneous legal mosaic was
perceived by commentators as reflecting Israel’s social and ethnic
complexity. In the area of criminal law in particular, Likhovski quotes
Israeli Supreme Court Judge Haim Cohn, who claimed that the new
penal code “[would] be one of the contributions, however modest and
ineffectual they may seem to be, to the progress of mankind under the

Id. at 730.
Assaf Likhovski, Argonauts of the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal Transplants and
Signaling, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 619 (2009).
236
Id.
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rule of law.” 237 Israel’s reliance on foreign influence was, thus, a way
to portray Israel as part of the civilized world and refashion its legal
eclecticism into a powerful display of advanced policymaking.
As Likhovski argues, the project of adopting and signaling a
cosmopolitan perspective cannot be divorced from Israel’s
geographical location and its colonial history. And, indeed, as
Alexandre Kedar explains, the study of comparative law cannot be
divorced from the legacy of colonialism and from the spatial,
geographical dimension. 238 Israel’s identity as a former colony (a
developing “learner”) is embedded in its legal DNA. Yael Berda
identifies the roots of its ostensibly modern surveillance routine in
British colonial practices. 239 Mitra Sharafi identifies the roots of its
lawyering profession, like those of the other British colonies, in the
history of the British metropole. 240 Various statutory practices in Israel,
in areas as diverse as corporations, 241 tax, 242 and water law, 243 are
embedded in its colonial history, as is its entire property law structure,
which hails back to its days as an Ottoman colony. 244 Even its
constitutional structure (Israel’s “basic laws”) evinces deep colonial
influences. 245 Specifically in the context of criminal justice, Binyamin
237
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(2009).
242
Assaf Likhovski, Is Tax Law Culturally Specific? Lessons from the History of
Income Tax Law in Mandatory Palestine, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 725
(2010).
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2012).
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Blum, Yoram Rabin and Barak Ariel identify deep British influences
on Israel’s procedure for admitting confessions into evidence, 246
despite the 1995 shift to a German-influenced criminal code.
If we accept this extension of Feeley’s thesis—namely, that
Israel, not only the United States, is a developing country from a
criminal justice perspective—a possible explanation why U.S.
correctional policy has been seductive and interesting to Israel might
rely on their similarities as developing countries. Looking at both
countries through the lens of development theory highlights several
relevant similarities. First, both countries have a strong legacy of ethnic
and racial conflict, which impacts the composition of the population
subjected to criminal justice control. Second, both countries are
characterized by high levels of interpersonal violence and, relatedly, a
high concentration of guns. In the United States, gun ownership is the
outcome of both illegal purchase and permissive gun laws, 247 and in
Israel, guns circulating in civilian hands are related to the wide
access—legal and illegal—to military weaponry even in civilian
spaces. 248 In both countries, fetishization of protectionism and
aggressive bravery plays into the culture of interpersonal violence.
Third, both countries are characterized by unusual levels of police
overreach and brutality, 249 far beyond their Western industrialized
counterparts. And fourth, both countries rank considerably higher

Binyamin Blum, Yoram Rabin & Barak Ariel, The Admissibility of Confessions
Under Israeli Law: Procedural and Substantive Differences Between the “Free and
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247
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ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL, 2017, https://law.acri.org.il/pdf/LooseGuns.pdf (arguing that there is a proliferation of insufficiently regulated weapons in
Israeli society, resulting in preventable crimes, specifically domestic violence.)
249
GUY BEN PORAT AND FANNY YUVAL, POLICING CITIZENS: MINORITY POLICING IN
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in Israel); FRANKLIN ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL (2017) (arguing that official
statistics fall short of exposing the full phenomenon of lethal force exercised by police
in the United States).
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than other Western industrialized countries in perception of political
corruption—in 2018, the United States at 22 and Israel at 34. 250
The context in which these characteristics arise is, of course,
different for the two countries. The United States has a long and
difficult legacy of slavery; 251 whereas in Israel the ethnic conflict stems
from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Occupation, 252 as well as
from ethnic and religious tensions within the Jewish population. 253
Moreover, gun ownership has a very different cultural significance in
the two countries, though they both share fear and concern about guns
ending up in inappropriate hands. And the differences in scale matter
a great deal; it has often been said that “American criminal justice” is
not a monolith, as there is considerable difference among state criminal
justice policies. 254 Still, on a national scale, the cultural comparisons are
striking. The trend of comparison is especially evident when
comparing the Netanyahu and Trump administrations’ positions on
“crimmigration,” drug enforcement, severity of punishment, and
racial/ethnic discrimination in application of laws. Some
manifestations of these policies have been particularly similar: The
separation of immigrant children from their families at the U.S.
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border, 255 widely criticized both domestically 256 and internationally, 257
was reverberated in the incarceration of African asylum seekers at
Saharonim prison in the desert, a policy move which similarly
provoked international critique. 258 Similarly, the Trump
Administration’s enthusiasm for the death penalty for drug dealers, 259
even as the penalty is in its final throes, 260 is echoed by legislative
efforts in Israel to make capital punishment a de-facto option 261--with
supporters in both countries making deterrence arguments.
CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING ISRAEL’S FASCINATION WITH AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
How can the similarity between the two countries, particularly
through the lens of political development, explain the impact of
American criminal justice on Israeli policy? In Lesson-Drawing in Public
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Policy, 262 Richard Rose explains that importing policies and ideas is a
politically contested process, in which the choice who to learn from
depends upon a subjective definition of proximity, epistemic
communities linking experts together, functional interdependence
between governments, and the authority of intergovernmental
institutions. 263 Because this is a subjective and contested process, what
Israeli policymakers see in the United States varies both generationally
and across partisan lines. While in the early 1980s, as a country recently
liberated from the legal shackles of British precedent, the U.S. example
might have been appealing as a former British colony, and in the early
1990s, as a beacon of civil rights (at least on paper); in the late 1990s
and 2000s U.S. public policy offers a glance in the mirror and the
recognition of an older sibling, complete with virtues and warts not
dissimilar from the Israeli ones.
The emergence of academic and legal elites in Israel that have
been educated to critique (and often fault) the U.S. model is crucial. As
Rose explains in Lesson Drawing, a crucial part of importing policies
across borders is an assessment of their implementation in their home
country—even before making the necessary cultural adjustments to
the new policy climate. 264 That this assessment has become less
glowing in the last decade and a half is a triumph of the critical work
of legal and socio-legal scholars in the United States, whose critique
resonated with their Israeli students and colleagues. In that respect, the
era of contention can be explained in two ways: the legacy of American
mass incarceration finally coming home to roost in international public
opinion, and the maturation of Israeli criminal justice policy into a
psychological rejection of the American “parental” authority.
It is imperative to encourage policymakers, legislators, and
litigators in Israel to view future developments in the United States
with a careful critical eye especially now, as human rights advocates
set out to fight the Netanyahu regime’s Trumpian tendencies to make
criminal law an instrument for disenfranchising, delegitimizing, and
oppressing an increasing number of social sectors. While a change in
both countries cannot come too soon, if reform is delayed in the United
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States, Israeli criminal justice must vocally and clearly indicate its
independence.

